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ETHNOS AND GLOBALIZATION: Ethnocultural Mechanisms of Disintegration of Contemporary Nations. Monograph
A. D. Orlov

A. L. Safonov


This monograph is devoted to one of the main problems of globalization – ethnocultural disintegration of society and the crisis of the contemporary nation. To explain the growth of ethnocultural differentiation in the context of globalization, an original concept of ethnos and nation genesis is proposed, in which the ethnos and the nation are viewed as different social communities in genesis, dynamics and functions, in which the individual participates simultaneously.





ETHNOS AND GLOBALIZATION: Ethnocultural Mechanisms of Disintegration of Contemporary Nations

Monograph



A.В L. Safonov

A. D. Orlov



electronic version of the monograph:

Safonov A. L., Orlov A. D.

Ethnos and globalization: Ethnocultural mechanisms of disintegration

of contemporary nations // Andrey Leonidovich Safonov, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich

Orlov. – Ekaterinburg: Ridero, 2018. – 300 p.



Authors:

Andrey Leonidovich Safonov, Dr. Sc.

Aleksandr Dmitr. Orlov, PhD.



Examiners:

Vladimir Svyatoslavovich Nikolsky, Dr. Sc.

Makhach Mustafayevich Vagabov, Dr. Sc.

Vadim Aleksandrovich Demin, Dr. Sc.



Translator Lidia Ashikhmina

Translator Irina Godovikova



© A. L. Safonov, 2018

© A. D. Orlov, 2018

© Lidia Ashikhmina, translation, 2018

© Irina Godovikova, translation, 2018



ISBNВ 978-5-4490-7095-1

Created with Ridero smart publishing system


They said to each other, “Come, let’s make bricks and bake them thoroughly.” They used brick instead of stone, and tar for mortar. Then they said, “Come, let us build ourselves a city, with a tower that reaches to the heavens, so that we may make a name for ourselves; otherwise we will be scattered over the face of the whole earth.”

But the Lord came down to see the city and the tower the people were building. The Lord said, “If as one people speaking the same language they have begun to do this, then nothing they plan to do will be impossible for them. Come, let us go down and confuse their language so they will not understand each other.”

So the Lord scattered them from there over all the earth, and they stopped building the city. That is why it was called Babel – because there the Lord confused the language of the whole world. From there the Lord scattered them over the face of the whole earth.



    (Genesis 11: 1—9)




Introduction


Most long-term forecasts ofВ global development at the end ofВ the twentieth century that were based on widely accepted scientific approaches and empirical patterns predicted the evolution ofВ globalization as the establishment ofВ aВ new global social community (aВ social entity) ofВ aВ supranational kind and the all-encompassing dominance ofВ cultural and political unification and convergence.

However, the current reality of globalization demonstrates that a global social community is not being formed despite the establishment of a global market, global digital (information) space, and manifold growth of temporary and permanent migration. Furthermore, as economic and informational globalization is expanding, the fragmentation and differentiation of cultures, civilizations, ethnicities and confessions, the “ethnicization’ of the collective consciousness, singling out ethnic identity as the leading one, is skyrocketing universally.

That means that, besides nation states and transnational corporations, global development entities (actors) are joined byВ an increasing number ofВ social entities ofВ aВ non-economic and non-state (non-political) nature, including ethnic communities (ethnoses).

Futurologists have had to face the unexpected: the growth of divergent tendencies; the growing number of actors participating in global processes; the revitalization and acceleration of the influence of ethnic and religious communities; the exacerbation of old ethnic and religious conflicts and the appearance of new ones. This contradicts the concepts that were formed in the twentieth century that postulate that humankind’s progress towards convergence, unification or universalization is irreversible; such concepts were based on the idea of continuous ascending progress, a multi-stage approach and economic determinism.

Therefore, social sciences are facing not only aВ fundamental scientific problem, but also the pressing social and pragmatic task ofВ creating ofВ aВ new paradigm ofВ sociogenesis that will function inВ aВ brand new environment ofВ globalization inВ aВ new historical age and that will allow analysis and prediction ofВ the evolution ofВ the leading social processes ofВ our time, including ethnic and cultural phenomena.

Such leading ethnic and cultural phenomena that require theoretical understanding inВ terms ofВ their social and philosophical positioning include the re-emergence ofВ ethnic communities, ethnicity and ethnic consciousness that is taking place amid the crisis and erosion ofВ modern nationalities.

The concept ofВ globalization as aВ category ofВ aВ wider sociopolitical and scientific discourse became widespread inВ the scientific community after 1991, when the falling apart ofВ the USSR and ofВ the system ofВ its allies eliminated all obstacles toВ the establishment ofВ aВ global market ofВ goods and services, including media, allowing significant growth ofВ international trade and migration as well as the global implementation ofВ neoliberal reforms that had been tested not long before that byВ Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.

That explains why globalization was seen generally (above all, by Henry Kissinger and Margaret Thatcher,[1 - Thatcher, Margaret. Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World / Trans. M. Albina Publisher, 2003. – 504 p.] its creators and supporters) as a politically determined and largely economic process of spread and universalization of the neoliberal variant of the western economic model and its global victory. All of this created an impression of the imminence of the creation of a global supracommunity, similar to the “end of history’[2 - Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. M.: Yermak, AST, 2005. – 592 p.] explored by Fukuyama and the creation of the global empire[3 - Hardt, M., Negri, A. Empire / Translation from English edited by G. V. Kamenskaya, M. S. Fetisov – M.: Praksis, 2004. – 440 p.] with a Euro-Atlantic civilizational nucleus and several circles of dependent subject-less periphery.

However, as the results of the establishment of the “united world’ have been manifesting themselves, the need has arisen to study a brand new social reality that is not limited to the phenomena of economic nature and trends of cultural unification and westernization.

The basics of the sociology of globalization were laid down in the works by Wallerstein,[4 - Wallerstein, I. The End of the World as we Know it: Social Science for the Twenty-First Century / Immanuel Wallerstein. M.: Logos, 2004. – 368 p.] Bell,[5 - Bell, D. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting. M.: Academia, 1999. – 956 p.] Giddens[6 - Giddens, A. Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives. M., 2004. – 340 p.], etc.

Philosophers, such as Kant, Marx, Teilhard de Chardin, Vernadsky, Russell, Toynbee, Jaspers etc., who were developing and substantiating the concept ofВ the gradual ascension ofВ humankind toВ the united global community were the forerunners ofВ modern studies ofВ globalistics.

The geo-economic and geopolitical aspects of globalization have been studied in the works by Buzgalin and Kolganov,[7 - Buzgalin, A. V., Kolganov, A. I. Global Capital. M.: Editorial URSS, 2004. – 512 p.] Delyagin,[8 - Delyagin, M. G. Global Crisis. General Theory of Globalization. Course of Lectures. M.: Ifra-M, 2003. – 768 p.], Inozemtsev,[9 - Inosemtsev, V. L. Democracy: forced and desired. Successes and failures of democratization on the brink of thousand years// Voprosy filosofii. 2006. №9 – p. 34—46.] Utkin[10 - Utkin, А. I. New Global Order. M.: Algoritm, Eksmo, 2006. – 640 p.] and others.

The influence of globalization on the national state and state institutes has been studied by Beck,[11 - Beck, Ulrich. Power in the Global Age: A New Global Political Economy. M.: Progress-Traditsiya, 2007. – 464 p.] Bauman,[12 - Bauman, Z. Globalization: The Human Consequences. M.: Ves Mir Publishing House, 2004. – 188 p.] Kissinger[13 - Kissinger, H. World Order. New York: Penguin Press, 2014.], Martin and Schumann[14 - Martin, H-P., Schumann, H. The Global Trap: Globalization and the Assault on Prosperity and Democracy. Translation / Zapadnya globalizatsii: ataka na protsvetanie i demokratiyu – M.: Al’pina, 2001. – 335 p.], Stryker,[15 - Stryker, R. Globalization and the Welfare State. M., 2004. Ч. Н. – p. 83—92.] Soros[16 - Soros. G. On Globalization / O globalizatsii – M.: Praksis, 2004. – 276 p.], Drucker,[17 - Drucker, P. Post-Capitalist Society. M., 1999. – p. 67—100.] Butenko,[18 - Butenko, A. P. Globalization: essence and contemporary problems / Sotsialno-Gumanitarnye Znaniya. 2002. №3. – p. 3—19.] Delyagin[19 - Delyagin, M. G. Globalization. Global Crisis and “Closing Technologies” // Transnational Processes: XXI Century. M.: Sovremennaya Ekonomika i pravo, 2004. – p. 24—51.], Rieger and Leibfried,[20 - Rieger, E., Leibfried, S. Limits to Globalization: Welfare States and the World Economy. M., 2004. 4. II. p. 94—101.] Kara-Murza,[21 - Kara-Murza, S. G. Globalization and crisis of enlightenment// Transnational Processes XXI Century. M., 2004. – p. 291—293.] Kagarlitsky,[22 - Kagarlitsky, B. Y. Marxism. M.: ACT, 2005. – 462 p.] Podzigun,[23 - Podzigun, I. M. Globalization as reality and problem / Philosophy. 2003. №1 – p. 5—16.] Pantin and Lapkin,[24 - Pantin, V. I., Lapkin, V. V. Philosophy of historical forecast-making. Dubna: Feniks+, 2006. – 448 p.] Pozdnyakov,[25 - Pozdnyakov, E. A. Nation, state, national interests // Voprosy ekonomiki 1994. №2 – p. 64—74.] Panarin,[26 - Panarin, A. S. Seduction by Globalization. M., 2002. – 440 p.] etc.

The world-systems approach to globalization as a process of an increasingly multi-faceted and all-encompassing interaction of social actors and entities was used by Wallerstein,[27 - Wallerstein, I. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. M.: Publishing House Territoriya Buduschego, 2006. – 248 p.] Braudel[28 - Braudel, F. Grammaire des civilisations / Grammatika tsivilizatsij – M.: Ves’ mir, 2008. – 552 p.], Amin,[29 - Amin, Samir. The American Ideology. M., 2005. – p. 211—219.],[30 - Amin, Samir. Political dimension // Globalization of Defiance. Translation. M., 2004. – p. 265—286.] and others.

The synergistic approach, based on a somewhat incorrect extrapolation of the pattern in natural science of the emergence of ordered structures in non-equilibrium thermodynamic systems into the social form of being, was used in the works by Budanov,[31 - Budanov, V. G. Methodology of synergy in post-nonclassical science and in education. PhD dissertation. M., 2007. – 56 p.] Kapitsa[32 - Kapitsa, S. P. Model of the Earth’s population growth // Success of physics. 1995. 26. №3 / Model’ rosta naseleniya Zemli // Uspekhi fizich. Nauk. 1995. №3 – p. 111—128.], Moiseyev,[33 - Moiseyev, N.N.Human Being and Noosphere. M.: Nauka, 1990—p. 331] Podzigun, Panarin,[34 - Panarin, A. S. Postmodernism and globalization: the project of liberation of property-owners from social and national responsibilities // Issues of Philosophy. 2003. №6 – p. 18—27.] Fuller, Shadzhe and others. An indisputable advantage of the synergistic approach is a general presentation of a problem in the creation and gradual sophistication of new structures and entities as a result of the dispersion of flows of energy and matter, which, when applied to social phenomena, may mean the development of divergent social processes.

The problem of the genesis of local social groups – ethnic groups and nations being the most important among them – has an evident interdisciplinary character and is studied under sociology, ethnology, social anthropology, conflictology and ethnopolitics, as well as within history-related disciplines.

The processes ofВ ethnogenesis, nation-building and (looking at it through aВ broader lens) the building ofВ social communities are studied within three schools ofВ thought: constructivism, instrumentalism, and primordialism.

Primordialism is based on an evolutionary approach toВ sociogenesis and ethnogenesis. It looks at large groups that have existed for aВ long time (inВ particular, ethnic groups and nations) as aВ result ofВ the long and continuous evolution ofВ social communities that maintain their agency even inВ the course ofВ deep social transformations ofВ society. Two leading strategies inВ the ethnology ofВ the nineteenth century, evolutionism and diffusionism, as well as the evolutionist approach inВ linguistics that allowed specification ofВ the genesis ofВ cultural and linguistic communities, established the basis for the primordialist approach.

Primordialism has two major branches, sociocultural (cultural primordialism) and sociobiological, the latter focusing on the genetic similarities of social groups – ethnic ones above all – as well as on the special social role of an instinctive underlying cause of social behaviour[35 - Lorenz, Konrad. On Aggression. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966. Translated by Marjorie Kerr Wilson. Originally published in Austria under the title DAS SOGENANNTE BÖSE. Zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression. Viena: Dr. G. Borotha-Schoeler Verlag, 1963, p. 263.]

The leading approach ofВ modern primordialism is undoubtedly cultural primordialism, which views the genesis ofВ large social groups (ethnic groups and nations) as aВ result ofВ the evolution ofВ social institutes and social relations. Cultural primordialism inВ Soviet and Russian science is represented byВ the works byВ Bromley, Kozlov, Arutyunov, Mnatsakyan,В etc.

The modern sociobiological movement, having overcome the legacy of racial sociogenetic theories of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is mainly represented by ethnogenetic[36 - Dawkins, R. The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene. M: Astrel’, 2010. – 512 p.],[37 - Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. Genes, Peoples, and Languages. New York: North Point Press, 2000. – 267 р.],[38 - Gil-White F. J. How thick is blood? // Ethnic and Racial Studies. 1999. №22 (5) – P. 789—820.],[39 - Geertz, C. The Interpretation of Cultures. M.: Rosspen, 2004. – 128 p.] and neurogenetic concepts close to behaviourism.[40 - Varela, F. Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for the hard problem // Journal of Consciousness Studies. 1996. №4 – P. 330—349.] However, despite its seeming attractiveness, the sociobiological variations of primordialism, at best, explain the formation of tribal communities in a simplified manner. They do not explain the genesis and the patterns of establishment and evolution of more developed and complicated communities, in which culture and politics play a systematically important role.

Constructivism believes the leading mechanism for sociogenesis to be a direct sociopolitical and socioeconomic construction of social communities from top to bottom by political elites, which is usually led through state institutions. Constructivists see modern ethnos as a sociocultural relic, an ideological phantom that the elites used to rule over the masses.[41 - Anderson, B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. M.: Kanon Press, 2001. – 286p.],[42 - Gellner, E. From similarity to ethnicity // Civilizations 1997. №5 – p. 41—54.],[43 - Berger, P., Luckmann, T. The social construction of reality. M.: Moscow Philosophy Fund: “Akademiya-Tsentr”, Isdatel’stvo “Medium”, 1995. – 334 p.]

The instrumentalists also see this social group as an outcome ofВ aВ target-oriented activity, not simply as an instrument ofВ power and elites, but as aВ tool or instrument ofВ the individuals that make up the group that allows use ofВ membership ofВ the group toВ reach certain goals or toВ fulfil certain social functions.

Fredrik Barth[44 - Barth, F. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. M: Novoye izdatel’stvo. 2006. – 286p.] is considered the leader of this movement. Tishkov,[45 - Tishkov, V. А. Russian people as European nation and its Eurasian mission // Political Class. 2005. 5 Mая.] Guboglo,[46 - Guboglo, M. N. Identification of Identity: Articles on Ethnosociology. M.: Nauka, 2003. – 288 p.] Voronkov and Osvald,[47 - Voronkov, В., Osvald, I. Introduction. Post-Soviet Ethnicity // Construction of Ethnic Community of St. Petersburg. St. Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin, 1998. – p. 7.] Shnirelman,[48 - Shnirelman, V. A. Misfortunes of one discipline: ethnogenetic research and Stalin’s national policy // Ethnographic Review. 1993. №3 – p. 52—68.] Kulagin,[49 - Kulagin, A. A. Ethnic and religious identification of the Druze community // Historical Journal – Scientific Research. 2012. №1 – p. 141—159.] Drobizheva,[50 - Drobizheva, L. M. Methodological problems of ethnosociological research// Sociological Journal. 2006. №3—4.] and Lurye,[51 - Lurye, S. V. Historical Ethnology: Coursebook for Universities. 2nd edition – M.: Aspekt Press, 1998. – 448 p.] as well as recent works by Popov,[52 - Popov, Y. A. Ethnic identification in the society through language // Politics and Society. 2012. №3 – p. 104—107.] Nizamova,[53 - Nizamova, L. R. Complex concept of contemporary ethnicity: limits and possibilities of theoretical synthesis// Journal of Sociology and Social Anthropology. 2009. №1 – p. 141—159.] Nimayeva,[54 - Nimayeva, B. B. Young people of Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug: repertoire of identitites in contemporary sociocultural context // Politics and Legislation. 2011. №9 – p. 75—81.] Ortobayev[55 - Ortobayev, V. V. Epistemological analysis of ethnosociology // Sociology in the System of Scientific Management: Materials of IV Russian Sociological Congress. M.: Sociological Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences, 2012. – p. 83—92.] and others, should be mentioned among Russian scientists subscribing to the constructivist doctrine. Informational and symbolist (identificational) approaches to ethno- and sociogenesis are in line with constructivism and instrumentalism.[56 - Arutyunov, S. A. Ethnogenesis, its forms and patterns // Etnopolitichesky vestnik. 1993. №1 – p. 10—19.],[57 - Susokolov, A. A. Structural factors of self-organization of ethnos // Races and Peoples. 1990. №20 – p. 5—39.],[58 - Hutchinson, J., Smith, A. D. (eds.) Ethnicity. Oxford Readers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. – p. 29—34.],[59 - Hale, H. E. Bashkortostan: the logic of ethnic machine politics and the consolidation of democracy // Timothy J. C., Hough J. F. (eds.) Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election of 1993. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1998. – p. 47—55.]

Sociological research interested in the revitalization of ethnic and ethno-social processes in the south of Russia, includes works by Avksentyev,[60 - Avksentyev, V. A. Northern Caucauses: Repolitization of Ethnicity and Conflictological Scenarios of Development // Observer. 2006. №6 – p. 19—20.],[61 - Matishov, G. G., Avksentyev, V. A., Batiyev, L. V. Atlas of Sociopolitical Problems, Threats and Risks in the South of Russia, V. III. Rostov-on-Don: SKNTS VSH Publishing House, 2008. – 176 p.] Abdulatipov,[62 - Abdulatipov, R. G. Russian Nation: Ethnonational and Civil Identity of the Russians in the Contemporary Context. M.: Novaya Kniga, 2005. – 472 p.] Gasanov,[63 - Gasanov, M. R. Paleo-Caucasus Ethnic Community and the Issue of Dagestan Peoples’ Origins. Mahachkala: Dagestan State Pedagogical University Publishing House, 1994. – 194 p.] Gadzhiyev,[64 - Gadzhiyev, K. S. Ethnonational and Geopolitical Identity of the Caucasus. Saabrucken: Lambert Academic Publishing. 2011. – 531 p.] Markedonov,[65 - Markedonov, S. M. Ethnonational and Religious Factors in Sociopolitical Life of the Caucasus Region. M.: Maks Press, 2005. – 379 p.] Tishkov,[66 - Tishkov, V. А. On phenomen of ethnicity // Ethnographic Review. 1997. №3 – p. 3—21.] Tkhagapsoyev,[67 - Tkhagapsoyev, Х. Political scientists’ keen interest in the Caucasusу // Kabardino-Balkarskaya Pravda. 2010. Feb. 6.] Chernous,[68 - Chernous, V. V. Increase in importance of ethnocentrism on the cusp of the first decade of the XXI century as consequence of imitational modernization of Northern Caucasus // Collection of Materials and Reports of III International Scientific and Applicability Conference “Caucasus – Our Home” (September 29—October 2, 2011, Rostov-on-Don) / Edited by Y. G. Volkov. Rostov-on-Don: Sotsialno-Gumanitarnye Znaniya, 2011. – p. 25—30.] Denisova,[69 - Denisova, G. S. Southern Russian identity in the context of administrative reorganization of the macro-region // Sociology in the System of Scientific Management: Materials of IV Russian Sociological Congress. M.: Sociological Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences, 2012. – p. 48—52.] Zhade,[70 - Zhade, Z. A. Structure of multilevel identity of the population of the Republic of Adygea // Sociology in the System of Scientific Management: Materials of IV Russian Sociological Congress. M.: Sociological Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences, 2012. – p. 74—83.] Sampiyev,[71 - Sampiyev, I. M. СаMоопределение народов: теория и онтология. Rostov-on-Don: SKNTS VSH Publishing House, 2004. – 152 p.] Hoperskaya,[72 - Khoperskaya, L. L., Kharchenko, V. A. Local Interethnic Conflicts in the South of Russia: 2000—2005. Rostov-on-Don: YNTS RAN Publishing House, 2005. – 164 p.] Hunagov,[73 - Khunagov, R. D. Russian identity in contemporary Northern Caucasus’ society// Sociology in the System of Scientific Management: Materials of IV Russian Sociological Congress. M.: Sociological Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences, 2012. – p. 62—68.] Tsutsiyev,[74 - Tsutsiyev, А. А. Atlas of Ethnopolitical History of Caucasus (1774—2004). M.: Evropa, 2006. – 128 p.] Shadzhe,[75 - Shadzhe, A. Y. Coexistence of identities in Northern Caucasus // Sociology in the System of Scientific Management: Materials of Russian Sociological Congress. M.: Sociological Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences, 2012. – p. 120—127.] Shakhbanova[76 - Shakhbanova, M. M. Ethnic identity of Ando-Tsezic group (based on results of sociological research) // Scientific Problems of Humanitarian Research. 2011. №6 – p. 54—62.] and others.




Chapter I. The crisis ofВ nations and increase ofВ importance ofВ the ethnos during globalization



The main goal ofВ social philosophy has always been toВ understand the leading tendencies ofВ historical evolution that determine the fate ofВ the society and the individual, toВ search for the few key patterns that allowВ us toВ see or even create the outlines ofВ the future through the chaos ofВ reality.

The key to understanding the world of today is, undoubtedly, globalization – the ever more complex process of qualitative sophistication, acceleration and integration of the development of humanity that is pointing with ever-growing certainty to the transition from the technical and social progress of the two preceding centuries towards uncontrollability and global catastrophe.

Globalization is, inВ the first place, aВ system ofВ qualitative social changes that include the formation ofВ not only aВ single global market, but also aВ global social and information environment, devoid ofВ spatial and political borders, giving rise toВ the previously unseen sophistication and acceleration ofВ social-historical processes. It also means the appearance ofВ global informational openness, the appearance ofВ new information technologies, directly and non-inertially, influencing individual and mass consciousness inВ real time, as well as aВ qualitative increase inВ contacts between geographically distant communities and individuals, including those that have not been facilitated byВ the state and its institutions.

InВ aВ more general sense, globalization can be defined as the process ofВ intensification ofВ all systems ofВ social relations and the formation ofВ aВ global interaction environment, which results inВ not only global, but local social phenomena too being formed under the weight ofВ remote external reasons and influences, leading toВ the all-encompassing, global linkage ofВ social communities, structures, institutions and cultures. The process ofВ globalization helps form aВ qualitatively new system ofВ social relations and institutions within which not aВ single phenomenon ofВ the social being on the local level cannot be studied from outside the all-encompassing system ofВ the links with other parts ofВ the global system.

However, while not so long ago the world was aВ sum ofВ relatively closed-off social systems, at the moment, all local social and economic systems assume an open character and cannot be studied unless inВ the global context.

As the economies of several countries are being integrated, globalization continues moving past the economy, which supplied the initial terminology for it, and begins to take on a global, total character that cannot be reduced to particular patterns, giving rise to the unpredictable chaos of processes of different order that are happening in social, economic, political, cultural and other spheres of social life. From the perspective of these processes’ systemic interaction, they make up globalization with its integral but internally contradictory and unstable structure. That is why the analysis and prognosis of the development of globalizational processes is being impeded by the transition from the technical and social progress of the previous two centuries towards a growing uncontrollability and global catastrophe

Thus, globalization, as a leading social phenomenon of our times is the establishment, development and qualitative increase in the interconnection of the global environment – in particular, its economic, political, informational and social sphere. It qualitatively strengthens interactions within the society and therefore causes increasing conflict among all social entities.

As aВ result ofВ this, crisis processes are sharply amplified inВ the time ofВ globalization, which is aВ qualitatively new stage ofВ historical evolution. Globalization is shown toВ be aВ progressively less stable system ofВ crises and catastrophes on all planes ofВ existence that feed into each other.




1.1. Globalization as aВ sociohistorical phenomenon


Globalization has aВ temporal dimension apart from functional dimensions such as economic, social, political and others.

Globalization is not a new tendency: intergovernmental, intercivilizational, and trade links and interactions have played a significant role throughout the history of humankind that has been through a few cycles of “globalization-localization’.

During the Hellenistic period and Roman domination, the prevailing tendency was for globalization (or, to be more exact, ecumenization, considering the isolation of the new world and the periphery of Eurasia and Africa). Conversely, regionalization and fragmentation of the territory into feudalistic and religious enclaves was the leading tendency of the Middle Ages.[77 - Safonov, A. L. Axial Age 2: return to origins or descent into darkness? // Vestnik Buryatskogo Universiteta. Issue 14 (Philosophy, Sociology, Political Science, Culturology) – Ulan-Ude, 2012. – p. 34—42.]

The Age ofВ Discovery became aВ new step towards globalization, bringing the previously isolated territories ofВ the New World, Africa and Asia into the global historical and economic process. However, inВ terms ofВ the degree ofВ involvement inВ globalization ofВ elites and local communities (including the European ones) up until the twentieth century, trade volumes were comparable toВ only aВ few percent ofВ domestic manufacturing and transcontinental migration routes only concerned aВ small part ofВ the population. The Hispano-Portuguese colonization ofВ the New World that drew people out ofВ parent states and streams ofВ gold flowing into Europe were more ofВ an exception proving the rule.

Globalization was preceded byВ the epoch ofВ industrialism, which began with the creation ofВ the railway tracks, steam fleet and telegraph that greatly changed the man-made environment and lifestyle inВ general.

It should be noted that globalization is traditionally considered to be preceded by the fight of the colonial empires over their share of Africa and the Second Boer War[78 - Davidson, A. B. Cecil Rhodes and his Time. – M.: Mysl’, 1984. – 367 p.] that ushered in the period of the global tug-of-war to remake the world order, including the two world wars.

It is not insignificant that the concept ofВ imperialism, which was initially aimed against the domination ofВ the British Empire, was fully formed and became aВ widely accepted political term byВ the beginning ofВ the World WarВ I.

On no account was Lenin’s famous work Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916)[79 - Vladimir Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Pluto Press,1996, 192 p.] a first attempt to construct a theory of imperialism. It was, instead, built as a polemic debate with an earlier work by Karl Kautsky[80 - Karl Kautsky. Ultra-Imperialism. Die Neue Zeit, September 1914.]. It also contains references to other earlier works by German, French and British authors, in particular Hobson’s Imperialism.[81 - Hobson, J. A. Imperialism. A Study. – London: Nisbet, 1902. – 400 p.]

Considering this work as a fait accompli, a century later one may see that Lenin, as a representative of the Marxist paradigm, was truly successful in singling out the essential features of a new stage of the development of capitalism that have fully shown themselves recently. They include not only the tendency towards monopolization of markets, which a hundred years ago had already come to replace “free competition’, a concept that became an ideological construct. The work also described the leading role of financial capital; the transition of incomes from the real sector to the financial; an outpacing development of export of capital; the transformation of metropolitan states into rentier states, or “Rentnerstaat’; and a new role of banks as the centres from which the economy is managed. Stock companies and subsidiaries that form – to put it in contemporary terms – transnational networks are given a special role in that work, as one of the key phenomena that defined the establishment of globalization as a qualitatively new stage of the sociohistorical evolution of humankind.

Lenin also remarked on the tendency of German capital to be exported into British colonies through the head of the empire, circumventing the colonial ownership – in other words, a tendency to move financial capital to jointly use less developed countries, a trend that fully manifested itself after World War II during neo-colonialism.

We can see that the theory ofВ imperialism created at the beginning ofВ the twentieth century within the Marxist paradigm contained all features typical ofВ the end ofВ the twentieth century and the beginning ofВ the twenty-first: that is, it was capable ofВ defining the key features ofВ globalization aВ hundred years before it came about.

In fact, only a chain of terminological innovations prevents us from seeing the globalization of the twenty-first century as a direct continuation of imperialism from the time of Cecil Rhodes,[82 - Davidson, A. B. Cecil Rhodes and His Time – M.: Mysl’, 1984. – 367 p.] which was interpreted by contemporaries quite adequately, as we may see today.

However, the theory ofВ imperialism, quite well-formed and corresponding fairly well toВ the social practice, was undeservedly forgotten at the end ofВ the twentieth century: at the time, the establishment ofВ globalization was aВ leading systemic phenomenon that was behind the fight among sociopolitical systems which defined the course ofВ the twentieth century, so globalization then seemed something essentiallyВ new.

Nevertheless, despite the few manifestations ofВ globalization, the impressive increase inВ physical and financial volumes ofВ international trade (especially during the world wars that spurred on international trade and cargo turnover), nation states and regional blocs during imperialism and industrialism generally had closed-off economic, political and informational spaces. InВ aВ situation where internal networks were more important than external ones and where the state could be seen as aВ closed-off self-regulating system, allowing for external trade, the world could be seen as the sum ofВ its parts, the description ofВ which did not require states toВ be viewed as part ofВ aВ global system.

The watershed moment for globalization came when the world’s leading states de facto turned into an open socioeconomic system while retaining nominal sovereignty. Their dependence on the global supra-system, including international political and financial institutions, has significantly strengthened and moved to a new level. The influence of this supra-system on the economic, social and cultural life of the population became comparable to the influence of national governments.

However, it would be imprudent to talk about globalization before 1991, when the forms of social life typical of Western civilization were given an impetus for global spread. The 1991 landmark comprises the political dissolution of the USSR and the involvement of the new countries that appeared on the USSR’s territory, its former allies helping to form a global community and global market economy which considerably widened the “periphery’ and “half-periphery’ of the global system.

Starting from 1991, aВ wave ofВ similar and almost simultaneous reforms swept across both the West and developing and post-socialist countries, including privatization ofВ the systemically important state monopolies such as railways, energy, network providers, education and medicine. That was the beginning ofВ the stage ofВ crisis and top-down dismantlement ofВ the classic imperialist bourgeois state and its social institutions. That was the stage ofВ the privatization ofВ welfare state and revenge ofВ the elites, when the state was losing its influence inВ the economic and social spheres ofВ the social being and transforming gradually into an instrument serving situational interests.

There had previously been no single socioeconomic environment on aВ global scale, but rather aВ range ofВ large ones: politically, ethnically and culturally heterogeneous states (including empires) with relatively closed-off economies and aВ certain number ofВ local and even regional trade and economy systems.

At the same time, any empire-like state, be it the Roman Empire or the state ofВ Genghis Khan, Arab Caliphate or China, was striving for maximum territorial expansion inВ order toВ gain new subjects, aiming toВ reach natural geographical limits ofВ territorial extension, seas and low-yield mountainous and desert-like terrains, devoid ofВ population and roads.

However, empires eventually reached the peak ofВ their territorial expansion, which was followed byВ aВ political crisis caused byВ the limited internal connections, the fragmentation ofВ empire elites and the increase inВ the length ofВ the borders that needed military protection.

The dramatic turnabout in world history came about on the cusp of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries – that is, during the Age of Discovery. From that time onwards, more Western European countries (first Spain and Portugal, then Britain, France and Germany) began basing their policies on economic considerations.

Due to the Europeans having monopolized direct sea routes to other continents, the system of global trade connections appeared and began to evolve, gradually enveloping the whole known world. The top positions in this global trade system were held be those who created it – namely, the Europeans. They were capable of reaping the benefits from trade operations with countries in Asia, Africa and America, large benefits over which they held a monopoly due to the non-equivalent – that is, the one-sided character – of this trade exchange. That led to the creation of a phenomenon that had not existed before in the history of humankind: the global economic system, also known as the global capitalist system or simply the modern global system). From the perspective of the world-systems approach, modern history is nothing other than a watershed moment for the creation and development of the world (global) economic system.

The most important features of the global economic system are that, firstly, it functions as a market – i.e. the trade exchange system – and secondly (and of the utmost importance), it does not have external social systems. At the same time, local economic and social systems, while retaining their agency, are becoming increasingly open to external factors, less independent. In other words, the global economic system, moving away from the political regulations of the state, signifies the accretion and expansion of capital.

As a result, the commercialization of the whole world – including the commercialization, mechanization (industrialization) and unification of all spheres of the social life that were previously uninvolved in market turnover – is the main objective developmental tendency.

Adequate conceptual study ofВ globalization leads toВ aВ whole range ofВ new methodology issues. InВ particular, it is widely known that all sociophilosophical theories comprise two components: the descriptive one that explains the world, and aВ prescriptive one, describing what should be, or the perfect condition ofВ the society and the human being.

Correspondingly, theories of globalization, claiming to be systemic, are forced not only to describe and explain, but also to provide a prescriptive model of social relations, either explicitly or implicitly, which means there should be an ideological component reflecting the interests of the elites, but at the same time calling upon the interests and values of wider social groups, including “panhuman’ ones.

The methodological weakness of theories of globalization lies in the fact that the external form of social theories – built upon the rules of the natural sciences, studying objective natural patterns – are inevitably hiding a subjective, instrumental, ideological component, predicated on the social, civilizational and corporate affiliation of the researcher and, on a more global level, on a certain scientific school of thought or a scientific community. The ongoing global commercialization of science and education makes the latent subjectivity of social studies explicit, as science becomes a commercial market of scientific services, where supply considerably exceeds demand. A so-called buyer’s market appears, where the client dominates and scientific services are more and more often requested by non-state agents.

InВ any case, the ideological, prescriptive component ofВ theories ofВ globalization should be singled out during the analysis as aВ model ofВ aВ society or aВ type ofВ social behaviour, designed for aВ certain social group (target audience). One should consider the theory ofВ aВ certain social phenomenon not only as aВ model ofВ this phenomenon, but also as aВ symbolical resource, forming social and individual consciousness.

Thus, existing concepts of globalization, while reflecting the point of view and interests of certain social agents, should be seen not only as theories, but also as instruments to promote these agents’ specific interests. Therefore, constructivist and instrumentalist approaches to sociogenesis, which take subjective moments of sociohistorical development into consideration, are especially important for the theory of globalization.

Are there any universally accepted postulates ofВ globalistics?

Undoubtedly, the fact ofВ the establishment ofВ the global market as aВ global environment ofВ economic and, therefore, social interaction that is levelling out the spatial disconnection ofВ local economies and the interaction ofВ local social systems, is universally recognized.

Most researchers agree that the objective basis of globalization is scientific and technological progress and the increase in productive forces, used by a range of economically and politically dominant countries (“the golden billion”) and their elites for their own economic and political ends, including the establishment of a world order that generally benefits them.

AВ certain consensus exists on the necessity ofВ preserving the cultural and civilizational diversity ofВ the world, which objectively clashes with the Western project ofВ globalization.

Most researchers believe that a unipolar model of globalization based on liberal fundamentalism allows no future for the existing local civilizations and corresponding cultural and historical communities, or for the West itself. At the same time, the modern scientific community cannot offer anything except a vague slogan of “dialogue of civilizations’.

The idea of the dialogue of civilizations, as an extremely abstract position devoid of clearly formulated ideas and of any connection to social agents, is formulated in the foreword to the Russian translation of Braudel’s Grammar of Civilizations:[83 - Braudel, F. Grammaire des Civilisations. – M.: Ves’ mir, 2008. – 552 p.] “Globalization develops at the same time as the multipolar world appears. Civilizations have to learn… to agree to the existence of other civilizations, admit that they will never achieve dominance over others, be ready to see equal partners in others.”

As aВ result, theoretical consensus on globalistics is limited byВ the fact-based side ofВ the globalizational processes.

As for the theory ofВ globalization as such, the process is ongoing inВ terms ofВ theory that reflects objectively the growing antagonism ofВ social agents ofВ global development, principally global and local elites. As aВ result, the theory ofВ globalization and contiguous scientific areas and disciplines form the stage for aВ battle between the interests ofВ global and local elites and may therefore be seen as the reflection ofВ globalization processes inВ the СЃollective consciousness.

It is therefore evident that the theory ofВ globalization needs toВ go beyond separate disciplines and local theoretical constructions toВ consider the interpretation ofВ globalization processes on aВ sociophilosophical level.

Most globalization models have been based on a multi-stage approach, typically including economic determinism. Within this approach, globalization is seen as an objectively predetermined, largely economic process of the spread and universalization of the Western economic model in its neoliberal version. This has created an impression of the establishment of a global “suprasociety’ (Zinoviev), the announcement of the “end of history’[84 - Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. M.: Yermak, ACT, 2005. – 592 p.] and the appearance of the global empire with a Euro-Atlantic civilizational nucleus and several rings of dependable and agentless periphery.

The scope ofВ the research may serve as aВ basis for the classification ofВ theoretical approaches.

The approach to globalization as an objective historical tendency of the extension of intergovernmental and intercivilizational interactions and contacts was developed in the works of Beck,[85 - Beck, Ulrich. 60. Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. M.: Progress-Traditsiya, 2001. – 384 p.] Berger,[86 - Berger, Peter, Luckmann, Thomas. The Social Construction of Reality // Translated by E. Rutkevich. M.: Nauka, 1995. – 342 p.] Huntington,[87 - Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order // Translated by P. Velimeyev. M.: AST, AST Moskva, 2006. – 571 p.] Goldblatt,[88 - Granin, Y. D. Ethnoses, Nation State and Formation of the Russian Nation. Experience of Philosophical and Methodological Research. M.: IF RAN, 2007. – 167 p.] Castells,[89 - Castells, Manuel. The Rise of the Network Society. M., 1999. – p. 492—505.] McLuhan,[90 - McLuhan, M. The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man / Mаршалл Mаклюэн. M.: Akademich. Proyekt: Fond “Mir”, 2005. – 496 p.] Soros,[91 - Soros, G. On Globalization. M.: Praksis, 2004. – 276 p.] Stiglitz,[92 - Stiglitz, J. World in the last decade of the twentieth century // Transnational Processes: Twenty-First Century. M., 2004. – p. 19—23.] Bratimov,[93 - Bratimov, O. V. Reality of Globalization: Games and Rules of the New Era / O. V. Bratimov, Y. M. Gorsky, M. G. Delyagin, A. A. Kovalenko. M.: INFRA-M, 2000. – 344 p.] Utkin,[94 - Utkin, А. I. Globalization: Process and Interpretation. M.: Logos, 2001. – 254 p.] Chumakov,[95 - Chumakov, A. N. Globalization. Limits of Whole World. M.: Prospekt, 2005. – 432 p.],[96 - Chumakov, A. N. Metaphysics of Globalization. Cultural-Civilizational Context. M.: Kanon+, ROOI “Reabilitatsiya”, 2006. – 516 p.] and others.

Geoeconomic and geopolitical aspects of globalization were studied in the works by Buzgalin and Kolganov,[97 - Buzgalin, A. V., Kolganov, A. I. Global Capital. M.: Editorial URSS, 2004. – 512 p.] Delyagin,[98 - Delyagin, M. G. Global Crisis. General Theory of Globalization. Course of Lectures. M.: Ifra-M, 2003. – 768 p.],[99 - Delyagin, M. G. Globalization. Global crisis and “closing technologies” // Transnational Processes: XXI Century. M.: Sovremennaya Ekonomika i pravo, 2004. – p. 24—51.] Inozemtsev,[100 - Inozemtsev, V. L. Democracy: forced and desired. Successes and failures of democratization on the brink of a thousand years // Issues of Philosophy. 2006. №9 – p. 34—46.] Subetto,[101 - Subetto, A. I. Capitalocracy and Global Imperialism. St. Petersburg: Asterion, 2009. – 572 p.] Utkin[102 - Utkin, А. I. New Global Order. M.: Algoritm, Eksmo, 2006. – 640 p.] and others.

The problem of the influence of globalization on the nation state and state institutions was studied in the works by Beck,[103 - Beck, Ulrich. Power in the Global Age: A New Global Political Economy. M.: Progress-Traditsiya, 2007. – 464 p.] Bauman,[104 - Bauman, Z. Globalization: The Human Consequences. M.: Ves Mir Publishing House, 2004. – 188 p.] Stryker,[105 - Stryker, R. Globalization and the Welfare State. M., 2004. C. N. – p. 83—92.] Drucker,[106 - Drucker, P. Post-Capitalist Society. M., 1999. – p. 67—100.] Butenko,[107 - Butenko, A. P. Globalization: essence and contemporary problems / А. П. Butenko // Sotsialno-Gumanitarnye Znaniya. 2002. №3 – p. 3—19.] Rieger and Leibfried[108 - Rieger, E., Leibfried, S. Limits to Globalization: Welfare States and the World Economy. M., 2004. 4. II. – p. 94—101.] Podzigun,[109 - Podzigun, I. M. Globalization as reality and problem / Philosophy. 2003. №1 – p. 5—16.] Kara-Murza,[110 - Kara-Murza, S. G. Globalization and crisis of enlightenment // Transnational Processes XXI Century. M., 2004. – p. 291—293.] Karmadanov,[111 - Karmadonov, O.A. Globalization and symbolic power // Philosophy. 2005. №5. – p. 49—56.] Kagarlitsky,[112 - Kagarlitsky, B. Y. Marxism. M.: AST, 2005. – 462 p.] Pantin,[113 - Pantin, V. I., Lapkin, V. V. Philosophy of Historical Forecast-Making. Dubna: Feniks+, 2006. – 448 p.] Panarin[114 - Panarin, A. S. Seduction by Globalization. M., 2002. – 440 p.], E. Pozdnyakov,[115 - Pozdnyakov, E.A. Nation, state, national interests // Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1994. №2 – p.64—74.] Spiridonov and others.

The world-systems approach to globalization as a process of increasingly multi-faceted and all-encompassing interaction of social agents and beings is used by Braudel[116 - Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilizations, New York: Penguin Books, 1993], Amin,[117 - Amin, Samir. The American Ideology. M., 2005. – p. 211—219.],[118 - Amin, Samir. Political dimension // Globalization of Defiance. Translation. M., 2004. – p. 265—286.] Wallerstein,[119 - Wallerstein, I. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction – M.: Publishing House Territoriya Buduschego, 2006. – 248 p.] and others.

The approach to global development based on resources and ecology – one of whose variants, the sustainable development concept, became the basis for UN policies on demographics and development – has been considerably influential. This approach is based on objective natural resource limits (the “natural ceiling’), on economic activity and, as a result, on optimal population size. Nevertheless, the concept of the crisis of resources and demographics, while it does single out objective issues, cannot in principle be used to describe and make a prognosis for the social component of this crisis and how it could play out.

The correspondence between convergent and divergent social processes may be the basis for a classification. The philosophers who created the concept of humankind’s multi-stage development towards a single global social community can be considered the forerunners of modern globalistics, and one could single out the fundamental works in this field by Kant, Marx, Teilhard de Chardin, Vernadsky, Toynbee, Russell, Jaspers and others.

Representatives ofВ the civilizational approach, who emphasize the unexpectedly stable preservation ofВ sociocultural communities and cultural-civilizational differences even inВ aВ connected economic and social community, insist on the restricted nature ofВ the convergent tendencies ofВ globalization inВ the sociocultural sphere.

Most existing theories and concepts are based on the reduction ofВ globalization as an all-encompassing phenomenon into separate, although significant, phenomena ofВ economic, sociocultural and political character.

InВ addition toВ the above, convergent aspects ofВ development (monopolization and unification, including ethnocultural) are being seen inВ absolute terms and the phenomenon ofВ social regression is being denied as an objective tendency, an attribute ofВ globalization.

It is equally important that globalization is a comprehensive system of major changes – often revolutionary or catastrophic ones – in separate spheres of the social being, a system that is not equal to the sum of its parts and engenders a qualitatively new level of difficulty of social phenomena in the new epoch.

The analysis and the prognosis for development ofВ globalization processes are hindered byВ the crisis-like character ofВ the changes, increasingly more likely toВ end inВ moving from the technical and social progress ofВ the two previous centuries towards growing ungovernability and global catastrophe: the modern world is changing faster than the science community can reach aВ consensus on the character ofВ the changes.

The threats and challenges posed by globalization are not limited to the objective problems related to resources, ecology and economy on which the scientific community focuses. Global threats of a social kind, subjective in nature and linked to the transformation of the system-building social communities – in particular, national and ethnic ones – play an equally important role.

Ethnocultural fragmentation ofВ civil nations is aВ new global threat eliciting not only the establishment ofВ new ethnic and religious conflicts and the energizing ofВ the old ones, but also new forms ofВ their establishment and development. Thus, the clash ofВ civilizations assumes not an intergovernmental but an internal, diffusive character tied toВ the elimination ofВ spatial borders and barriers.

It seems efficient toВ divide the phenomena that make upВ globalization into objective components, linked generally toВ the spike inВ limits on natural resources and the objectively inevitable establishment ofВ the global economic and social space, and subjective components, linked toВ the activities ofВ the social agents ofВ global development, including large and socially important communities such as nations and ethnic groups.

One of the leading objective components of globalization is the increase in global connectivity – that is, economic, transport and information globalization, as well as a global crisis of resources and demographics.

At the same time, growth ofВ the objective component ofВ the global systemic crisis inevitably leads toВ subjective manifestations inВ the form ofВ aВ confrontation between the social agents ofВ the global process involved inВ the fight for the limited resources, not so much byВ the desire toВ reap benefits and rule, but byВ the necessity toВ save oneself.

Objective and subjective components should be singled out inВ the theoretical approaches toВ globalization. It has been established that the theories may be descriptive or prescriptive. When analysing theories and models ofВ globalization, one should single out their objective, descriptive component, and the subjective component that reflects the peculiarities, interests and intentions ofВ the agent that shows aВ preference for aВ certain theoretical approach.

The prescriptive component ofВ social theory (including the theory ofВ globalization), understood as an ideal model ofВ society, plays aВ special part inВ forming nations and other social communities ofВ political genesis. The national idea is nothing short ofВ the social order controlling the masses and forming their common identity.

Therefore, one should single out an ideological, prescriptive component of the theory of globalization – in other words, a value-based message, aimed at a certain social group (target audience), born out of certain social agents (usually elites), using ideology as a social management tool actively shaping or “building’ social reality.

Therefore, comparative philosophical-methodological analysis ofВ well-known theories and globalization concepts, created within various science disciplines, shows that most are based on the reduction ofВ globalization as an all-encompassing phenomenon toВ separate, albeit significant, economic or political phenomena.

At the same time, most existing globalization concepts, apologetic and critical theories, exhibit absolutization ofВ convergent aspects ofВ the development, monopolization and unification, including the ethnoculturalВ one.

The aforementioned limitations placed on theoretical approaches inevitably lead toВ cognitive restrictions that hinder the theory not only from making forecasts, but also from explaining the course ofВ the global development post factum, necessitating aВ review ofВ the sociophilosophical approaches used inВ certain social studies.

Globalization is usually described using the well-known categories of internalization of the economy and integration of states – in other words, from the point of view of economic determinism and the concept of world politics as the interaction of sovereign states.

However, globalization does not simply weaken nation states that reached their development peak inВ the twentieth century, including great powers, and erode nations as system-building social communities, but also brings toВ life new agents inВ the global game, new centres and power mechanisms that serve as alternatives toВ the nation state.

According to one of the most prominent contemporary philosophers and sociologists, the creator of social structuration, Anthony Giddens,[120 - Giddens, Anthony. Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping our Lives. London: Profile, 1999. Translated to Russian. M.: Ves’ mir, 2004. – 120 p.] the process of globalization cannot be reduced to such substantial factors as information and communication technologies and the liberalization of trade and finance.

The concept of the “hybridization’ of society that presupposes the process of cultural, racial, ethnic mixing and miscegenation[121 - Prazauskas, A. A. Ethnonationalism. Multinational state and globalization processes // Polis. 1997. №2 – p. 95—105.] has gained some traction. Therefore, hybridization is a model of a slowed-down convergence that reduces new entities to mechanic superposition, overlaying already known phenomena and entities.

According to Guseynov,[122 - Guseynov, A. A. Individual and nation in light of globalism // Eastern Christian Civilization and Eastern Slavic Society in the Contemporary World. M., 2001. – p. 25—33.] globalization is the transformation of long-standing, rather independent (although capable of complex interactions) cultural-civilizational and nation state forms of social life into a single system including all of humankind. This new system inevitably takes a stand against those forms of collective life which it is supposed to replace in a new, wider, inclusive (to the point of being universal) synthesis.

The confrontation ofВ the global and the local becomes especially evident, and dramatically antagonistic, when globalization moves beyond economy toВ take over cultural, political and ideological (inВ aВ wider sense, including outlook, mentality) spheres.

According to Stepin, globalization is a choice between the two scenarios, which are called the “golden billion” concept and the “dialogue of civilizations” concepts.[123 - Stepin, V. S. About Types of Civilizational Development and Future Scenarios. The Time of Changes and Future Scenarios. M., 1996. – 368 p.]

The golden billion concept stems from the idea of globalization as the rule, the triumph of Western civilization and the Western peoples, “the end of history”[124 - Fukuyama, Francis (1989). “The End of History?”. The National Interest (16): 3—18] The rest should strive to become more like them under the threat of being relegated to an existence on the periphery or the semi-periphery. In the same manner, the future global society is seen as a semblance of the feudal and hierarchical system in the centre, with concentric circles of various levels around it.

The concept of the “global human ant hill” (Cheloveynik), as a final and definitive variant of the integration of humankind within the Western paradigm, was sociologically forecast and shown in the work of Zinoviev.[125 - Zinovyev, A. A. Global Anthill. M., 1994. – 448 p.]

The events ofВ the last two decades provide objective proof thatВ globalization, as the establishment ofВ aВ qualitatively more connected and homogenous global environment, does not lead toВ the extinction ofВ the formed social communities, similarly toВ how biological evolution inВ ecosystems does not lead toВ aВ decrease inВ biodiversity. As aВ result, despite the obviously outdated nature ofВ religious and ethnic social institutions, the influence ofВ ethno-religious and ethnocultural processes across the world is increasing as the migration flows across states are increasing, the state institutions are losing their significance and, consequently, the nation state identity is weakening, being replaced byВ an ethnic and religious identity.

From that point of view, the epoch of globalization is analogous to the axial age – a pivotal age of the formation of the first local civilizations, introduced by Karl Jaspers – the secession and the setting apart of the political sphere and, as a consequence, the appearance of the largest global denominations that defined the global history for ages to come.[126 - Safonov, A. L. Axial Age 2: return to origins or descent into darkness? // Vestnik Buryatskogo Universiteta. Issue 14 (Philosophy, Sociology, Political Science, Culturology). Ulan-Ude, 2012. – p. 34—42.]

Consequently, globalization is not aВ gradual evolutionary approach toВ the only possible equilibrium point, but aВ global crisis during which catastrophic and, accordingly, essentially unpredictable major changes occur inВ the global society, linked toВ the establishment, development and extinction ofВ aВ wide range ofВ social agents as aВ result ofВ an increasing global confrontation that is not limited byВ spatial barriers.

As aВ consequence, aВ global economic empire, even if it swallows the whole world, gives rise toВ new processes ofВ structuration and divergence inside itself, undoubtedly begetting the possibility ofВ aВ historical choice, aВ bifurcation ofВ the historical process.

At the same time, the main consequence ofВ the variability ofВ global development and the increase inВ the number ofВ agents inВ aВ new global world is the undoubtedly uncontrollable nature ofВ global sociohistorical development that reaches its peak during historical crises.

The concept ofВ the dialogue ofВ civilizations, justifiably assuming that the sociocultural sphere is not aВ carbon copy ofВ economic processes, proposes the principle ofВ equality ofВ civilizations, cultures and peoples, and sees the ideal global society as unity inВ diversity.

In fact, the concept of the dialogue of civilizations is a cover for the global periphery already formed to counter the pressure of the West in terms of the unification of culture and values, and to work out its own project for the existence in a united world. Seen from this angle, globalization is a challenge for the cultural, civilizational and national identity, which is applicable to all development scenarios, including the concept of the dialogue of civilizations.[127 - Guseynov, A. A. Individual and nation in light of globalism // Eastern Christian Civilization and Eastern Slavic Society in the Contemporary World. M., 2001. – p. 25—33.]

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the process is currently happening in a somewhat different way – that is to say, an ideology of the supremely wide community, the people of the Western world, the “golden billion’, is being formed, which caters for global confrontation in the sphere that is responsible for material wealth. A confrontation is inevitable within a new global community, as the fight for natural resources is gaining momentum due to the exponential increase in population size, in particular. Ideology is a subjective, collective look at the reality.

At the same time, the idea ofВ the dialogue ofВ civilizations as an ideal and almost conflictless development, presented as an alternative toВ the reality ofВ globalization and the real strategy ofВ globalization, is not an actual alternative: at best it is an ideal tendency, if not wishful thinking. The idea is rooted exclusively inВ theory and fails toВ make it not only through the test ofВ societal practice, but through detailed work, aВ creation ofВ aВ local applied model ofВ such aВ dialogue. While real interests and agents ofВ the global process are behind globalization, the universal theoretical idea ofВ the dialogue ofВ civilizations does not seem toВ be powered either byВ economic interests that would outweigh the benefits ofВ globalization for elites, including local ones, or byВ agents, not only interested inВ symmetrical, equitable dialogue, but capable ofВ organizingВ it.

There does not seem toВ be aВ referee overlooking the fight, someone interested and capable ofВ forcing dialogue participants toВ reach aВ consensus that is not simply defined byВ economic or some other kind ofВ power wielded byВ the participants during which life or death issues are being solved. The result ofВ direct interaction between aВ wolf and aВ lamb, without any mechanical or spatial barriers, is evident; the weaker side calls for equal dialogue notwithstanding.

Ultimately, the idea of the dialogue of civilizations is at best one of the forms taken by the losers’ plea with the winners for mercy, a form of integration into a Western model of globalization.

Another form of local outsiders’ appeal for mercy aimed at the leaders of global development is the idea of the preservation of civilizational (cultural) diversity, clearly repeating the slogan urging the “preservation of the biodiversity” of the environment. Preservation of the biodiversity is nothing short of a strategy to maintain the physical being of the ethnocultural community at the price of the loss of historical agency and transformation from an agent into an object of guardianship, the transformation of a local community into a guarded biological entity.

Nevertheless, the status ofВ aВ guarded object has become aВ relatively successful solution for the trap ofВ globalization for many primitive ethnic groups (aboriginal peoples, few inВ number, with aВ traditional economy).

Overall, when globalization is pressuring local social communities and groups, two types of reaction manifest themselves: a short circuit – an establishment of a guardian-like collective consciousness, the transformation of local communities into diasporas; and the urge for local and regional communities politically shaped into states to enter globalization on their own terms, as advantageous as possible.

A third option is available – a creation of one’s own global project – but that route requires plenty of resources and is unequivocally available only to China.

In any case, in criticizing, or rejecting, globalization in its Western, expansionist variant, one should recognize that the problem and relevant challenges will not go away, as the causes of globalization – globalization of the economy, the transformation of local social communities into open systems, the opening of spatial and information barriers, the growing crisis of resources and demographics – do objectively exist and increase.

Therefore, the majority ofВ well-known theories and concepts ofВ globalization are based on the reduction ofВ globalization as an all-encompassing phenomenon into separate, albeit essential, phenomena ofВ an economic or political nature.

Contemporary Russian studies ofВ globalization focus on several theoretical approaches that inadvertently reflect the power dynamics inВ Russia and aroundВ it.

The neoliberal approach toВ the processes ofВ globalization that has been largely accepted as the official concept ofВ the reformation and development ofВ Russia reflects the views ofВ contemporary Russian elites, whose interests are toВ aВ great extent tied toВ the resource-based economic cycle and global economic structure.

It is essentially a matter of the local adaptation of such classics of neoliberalism as Hayek[128 - Law, Legislation and Liberty, 3 vols. – London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973—1979.], Friedman[129 - Milton Friedman Capitalism and Freedom. The University of Chicago Press,1962] and Popper.[130 - Popper, K. The Open Society and its Enemies. M., Feniks, Mezhdunarodny fond “Kulturnaya Initsiativa”, 1992. – 448 p.] Correspondingly, negative consequences of the total liberalization of spheres of human being are presented as objectively inevitable and, as a result, as ungovernable phenomena without any alternative, such that an attempt to control them may result in an even worse outcome.

InВ general, liberal approaches toВ globalization as an extreme version ofВ economic determinism are characterized byВ denial ofВ the systemic complexity ofВ social development that, inВ principle, cannot be reduced toВ phenomena and patterns ofВ an economic and material kind.

Therefore, the neoliberal concept ofВ globalization that has been taken up byВ the elites and which presents aВ condensed expression ofВ their interests, takes on the character ofВ an objective historical factor. Chubais and Popov are typical and influential representatives ofВ neoliberal philosophy and ideology that are also part ofВ the Russian elite.

On the whole, neoliberalism is interesting not so much as aВ theoretical model ofВ aВ descriptive type, but rather as aВ prescriptive theory, which, put into practice inВ economic policies, is aВ typical manifestation ofВ globalization.

InВ particular, neoliberalism, when thought ofВ as aВ phenomenon ofВ collective consciousness, can be considered aВ direct result ofВ local elites separating themselves from local communities, aВ vertical fragmentation and aВ crisis ofВ post-industrialism nations, as will be discussed below.

Considerable scientific results have been achieved within the socio-ecological approach that looks at globalization from the point ofВ view ofВ aВ global ecological, resource and demographic crisis. It should be noted that the socio-ecological approach has, since the very beginning, been controlled byВ representatives ofВ global elites inВ the face ofВ the Club ofВ Rome and further international organizations and scientific communities.

By manipulating global threats, supporters of the concepts of sustainable development and zero growth motivate states and corresponding social communities to step back from choosing their own developmental path. They promote the creation of supranational institutions of global political power that member states cannot control or see through, using objective necessity to justify the lowering of the life standard and social guarantees for most of the world’s population, even the “inevitable’ decrease in the Earth’s population.

However, the term “sustainable development’ allows us to see clearly the interests of global financial elites behind it, lobbying for the maintenance of and increase in inequality of the global nucleus and the global periphery, to solve global contradictions at the expense of economic and political outsiders of the global community. Notably, Mikhail Gorbachev became a well-known supporter and promoter of global sustainable development, publishing several compilatory works under his name.[131 - Gorbachyov, M. S. My Manifesto Land. St. Petersburg: Питер, 2008. – 160 p.]

Nevertheless, Russia’s groundwork in basic natural science could not but result in scientific achievements, important not only in a practical sense but in terms of general philosophy. The most notable in this regard is concept of physical economy and a number of works on globalistics and system analysis of global development by some members of the Russian science community. Geophysicist and climatologist Kondratyev and his associates[132 - Kondratyev, K. Y., Krapivin, V. F., Savinykh, V. P. Perspectives of Civilization Development: Multidimensional Analysis. M.: Logos, 2003. – 576 p.] should be noted among the latest, as well as the works by Fedotov[133 - Fedotov, А. P. Globalistics: Origins of the Science of the Contemporary World: Lectures. M.: Aspekt-p Press, 2002. – 224 p.] and Subetto,[134 - Subetto, A. I. Capitalocracy and Global Imperialism. St. Petersburg: Asterion, 2009. – 572 p.] developing the noospheric approach.

The crisis of the formational approach resulted in a wave of interest in the civilizational approach. The first post-revolutionary reprint of Danilevsky’s[135 - Danilevsky, N. Y. Russia and Europe. M.: Kniga, 1991. – 573 p.]Russia and Europe became a landmark moment for the rehabilitation of the civilizational approach.

The publication ofВ the works ofВ Leo Gumilev, which may not have solved but at least presented clearly the problem ofВ ethnogenesis and the correlation between ethnographic and nation state inВ the historical process, became an important source ofВ renewed interest inВ civilizational issues and the overcoming ofВ economic determinism.

However, interest in the civilizational approach sprang mainly from the reality of globalization, namely the crisis of the classic nation state of the industrial epoch and a flare-up of crisis processes of an ethnocultural kind – above all, processes of ethnic and religious fragmentation of civil nations and invigoration of ethnicism, ethno-separatism and clericalism that filled the institutional vacuum born from the crisis of social institutions in the industrial epoch.

The split ofВ the USSR and aВ number ofВ eastern European states (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) into ethnic enclaves that gained the status ofВ sovereign states entailed the need for aВ theoretical and ideological basis for corresponding projects ofВ state construction and attempts toВ create them.

From the point of view of this study, it is of the utmost importance that scientific work on ethno-political issues is carried out, among others, by corresponding local elites that aspire to political separation or a special status within large states (ethnic communities within Russia, for example). The dissertation by Zaripov[136 - Zaripov, A. Y. Ethnos as agent of sociopolitical and cultural development: contemporary aspect. PhD dissertation 09.00.11. Russian State Library, 2005 (Russian State Library funds) – p. 3—4.] is a typical work illustrating this. Stating that “despite expectations of scientists and politicians, ethnicity not only failed to disappear, but showed a tendency for the expansion on a group level. Ethnic identity, ethnic feelings, ethnic solidarity stopped fitting into contemporary globalist tendencies that led to the unification of peoples”, Zaripov presents an idea of strengthening the ethno-confessional regionalization of Russia.

It should be noted that direct or implicit call toВ raise the status ofВ titular ethnic groups is typical ofВ the many sociological works on ethno-political issues that are being researched inВ Russia and inВ new independent states inВ the territory ofВ the former USSR.

Obviously, the goal toВ justifyВ raising the status ofВ ethnic autonomies is linked toВ certain support on the part ofВ regional ethnic elites trying toВ transform ethnic communities into political ones through purposeful artificial construction ofВ the idea ofВ aВ nation state (ideology) and aВ corresponding collective consciousness based on the ethnic culture.

On the theoretical level, the goal toВ assign political status toВ ethnic autonomies is based partly on post-modern concepts ofВ constructivism and instrumentalism, partly on the ideas on multi-stage transformation ofВ the ethnicity into aВ nation.

The crisis ofВ the formational approach as aВ form ofВ economic determinism caused reasonable interest inВ the civilizational approach which focuses on sociocultural issues.

Yakovets[137 - Yakovets, Y. V. Globalization and Interaction of Civilizations. M.: Ekonomika, 2001. – 416 p.] should be singled out among Russian researchers studying globalization through the civilizational approach.

Yakovets’ “Globalization and interaction of civilizations” proposes several key concepts of the contemporary civilizational approach to globalization:

1. The history ofВ humankind is periodic change inВ global civilizations that assumes the form ofВ changing global historical cycles.

2. Each global civilization can be presented as aВ five-step pyramid, with aВ demographical substrate with its biosocial needs and manifestations as aВ foundation. The pyramid top comprises spiritual and cultural phenomena, including culture, science, education, ideology, ethics and religion. Social transformation begins at the base and gradually transforms all the floors ofВ the pyramid, which leads toВ the change ofВ civilizations.

3. The intensity ofВ intercivilizational interactions is increasing with each historical cycle, with humankind gradually becoming aВ united social system as aВ result.

4. The contemporary period is the transition from an industrialized toВ aВ post-industrialized global civilization.

5. Processes ofВ globalization are aВ typical attributive characteristic ofВ the establishment ofВ aВ contemporary post-industrialized global civilization.

6. The main contradiction ofВ aВ neoliberal-technocratic model ofВ globalization is the fact that it is not inВ the interests ofВ humankind, but inВ the interests ofВ the largest transnational corporations.

According to Yakovets, the process of sociocultural unification, the convergence of local communities, is a threat because it lowers the viability and potential for the development of humankind. The formation of civilizations of the “fourth generation” is a response to this challenge. Yakovets discussed his concept built on the idea of the historically evolving structure of local civilizations, which includes the consequential change of civilizational leadership, in several works.[138 - Yakovets, Y. V. At the Origins of New Civilization. M., 1993. – 137p.],[139 - Yakovets, Y. V. Cycles, Crises, Forecasts. M., 1999. – 283 p.]

At the same time. Yakovets believes that at the moment the sociocultural unification of local civilizations is generally prevalent. Therefore convergence of the local civilizations is moving toward the global one – that is to say, it de facto assumes the neoliberal model of global convergence (“Westernization’, according to Zinovyev) as a basis, without seeing or suggesting either alternative development models or agents interested in the alternative development.

Meanwhile, global unification is impossible, not least because peripheral local civilizations are fighting the current dominant Western civilization. Qualitatively new types ofВ social life, social norms and rules, alternative values and models ofВ social life will appear inВ the course ofВ this fight.

Having swallowed the whole world, the global civilization will inevitably engender new processes ofВ the formation ofВ structures and groups.

However, Yakovets’ rejection of the formational approach leads to the rejection of its main achievement – the understanding of class and group interests as the most important powers behind the sociohistorical development. It also leads to rejection of the achievements and possibilities of sociological structuralism, which sees society as a system of objectively existing social groups and structures which include, in particular, class and ethnocultural communities.

Azroyantz[140 - Azroyantz, E. A. Thoughts on future // Globalization, Conflict or Dialogue of Civilizations? M., 2002. – p. 37—45.] presents his unique model of globalization as a concept of historical cycles, singling out three most important cycles in the evolution of the humankind: the establishment of man; the establishment and development of social community; and, ultimately, the establishment of the global social mega-community as the most advanced moral and spiritual form of human existence.

Development cycles are linked byВ transition periods during which situations occur where the historical choice ofВ the next road toВ take must be made. These are seen as the bifurcation points, the arborization ofВ the trajectory ofВ historical development. Each cycle is looked upon as an evolutionary niche, while the transition during which aВ possible path ofВ development for local or global social community is chosen is seen as aВ choice and the mastering ofВ aВ new niche. At the same time, according toВ Azroyantz, the possibility ofВ fatality cannot be ruled out for local civilizations and for humankind inВ general inВ the current global crisis as one ofВ the variants ofВ the development ofВ the situation.

Azroyantz justifiably believes that humankind is experiencing a civilizational crisis that corresponds to the transition from the second cycle – i.e. the establishment of society – to the third one, the establishment of the social megacommunity.

In view of this, according to Azroyantz, the contemporary liberal model of globalization (globalization of scientific and technological progress and of financial capital) precludes moving onto a new level of development, which is why the creation of a qualitatively new “humane’ model of global development is required.

However, as Azroyantz rightly believes, social agents capable ofВ and interested inВ resisting scientific and technological progress and managing the process ofВ globalization on behalf ofВ humankind have not yet been formed inВ the contemporary world.

At the same time, Azroyantz supposes that the spiritual and technological development ofВ society are heading inВ opposite directions and, as aВ result, technological development under certain conditions objectively gives rise toВ social regression, which can be observed inВ the sphere ofВ social relationships. Both cultural-civilizational unification and the general deterioration ofВ culture occur during neoliberal globalization.

However, appeal to the networks, characterized by shapelessness and lack of obvious leadership centres and popular in the age of artificial social networks, serves only to stress the agentless nature of Azroyantz’s approach, which has no place for real political actors in the global process and their interests.

On the whole, Azroyantz’s theoretical approach is limited to relating the facts of globalization, highlighting its typical system of gradually increasing internal contrasts. It does not go further than reproaching the new world order.

At the same time, Azroyantz, while declaring the civilizational approach as aВ methodological system, is de facto offering his version ofВ aВ formation-based approach under the guise ofВ historical cycles. He repeats the main premise ofВ economic reductionism (and liberal fundamentalism, as one ofВ its varieties) inВ terms ofВ the fatal inevitability ofВ the convergence ofВ cultures and civilizations as aВ global economy is formed.

Therefore, the works byВ Yakovets and Azroyantz, as typical contemporary works on the sociology and culturology ofВ civilizations, are illustrative ofВ the passive reflection ofВ local social groups (including local civilizations, such as Russia), who find themselves and their systems ofВ interest forced byВ globalization onto the periphery ofВ social life.

Typically, this civilizational approach is based on a convergent, effectively multi-stage model of the development of social communities, the development of which occurs through the convergence of preceding communities until a global culturally homogenous society (“social megacommunity’, “global human ant hill’, “cheloveynik’ and others) is created.

At the same time, obvious contemporary tendencies towards ethnocultural divergence, fragmentation and aВ sharp increase inВ the importance ofВ ethnicity and religiousness are being ignored.

Pivovarov[141 - Pivovarov, Y.S. Historiography or anthropology // Globalization. Conflict or Dialogue of Civilizations? M., 2002. – p. 162—170.] raises the issue of the contemporary state of the formation-based and civilizational approach as complementing each other. He stresses in particular that the formation-based approach borrows key ideas from Christianity, including the universality of history, its patterns and the possibility of singling out periods within history.

Fursov[142 - Fursov, А. I. At dusk of contemporary times: terrorism or global war? // RIZH. 1999. – V. II №3 – p. 193—231.] stands out among the supporters of a formation-based approach, since he sees history not only as a fight among classes, social groups and state bodies within a certain societal formation, but as long cycles of standoffs between elites and lower classes that spread to the larger civilizational space and up to the global level during the last historical cycle. According to Fursov, the current moment is characterized by the global vengeance of the elites and, as a consequence, the global crash of social achievement of the masses.

Fursov sees a mutual need for social cooperation that requires a certain structure of the “social pyramid’ as a factor that determines the equilibrium of the higher and the lower classes coexisting within a society. In this regard, the lack of population after wars or the epidemics of the Middle Ages led to the emancipation of the third estate. Industry’s need for workers and then for markets for manufactured goods led to constraints upon elites and the rise in the social standing of the masses, the appearance of socialism first as a school of thought, then as a social system, and the creation of a middle class in industrialized bourgeois states.

Nevertheless, according toВ Fursov, globalization is yet another revenge ofВ the elites who have lost connection with the nation state basis and who reap benefits from the privatization ofВ the welfare state created inВ the industrial epoch.

The important task set before the theory ofВ globalization is toВ create aВ theoretical world model (or several compatible models showing different spheres and aspects ofВ social existence and collective consciousness), allowingВ us toВ model and compare variants and models ofВ global development and global management. This will at least allow the introduction ofВ qualitative criteria ofВ efficiency and comparison ofВ various models and trajectories ofВ potential development.

Globalization engenders strong contradictions touching upon deep ontological foundations ofВ the being ofВ humankind as well as local communities at all levels. It would seem that the structure ofВ contradictions should be an objective depiction ofВ globalization. However, theoretical views ofВ globalization are essentially subjective and usually reflect interests and points ofВ view ofВ aВ certain social agent.

Pirogov[143 - Pirogov, G. G. Globalization and civilization diversity of the world. Political science analysis: Political Science PhD dissertation of political science PhD candidate 23.00.02 (from Russian State library archives).] says that: “Globalization these days is perhaps the most fashionable world in political slang. However, everyone understands it differently. The differences in understanding are an estimation and this leads to a new �Babel confusion of tongues,’ threatening to crash the Babel tower before it has been built. Strong interests are behind each understanding of globalization. The process of globalization is permeated with sharp contradictions.” A detailed list of key contradictions can be found in the work by Timofeyev.[144 - Timofeyev, T. T. Contradictions of globalization and social awareness // Challenges of Globalization. Political and Social Dimensions. M., 2001. – p. 9—22.]

The current stage ofВ economic globalization, whose point ofВ departure is Western victory inВ the Cold War, is characterized byВ the ubiquitous and clichГ©d commercialization and privatization ofВ state monopolies (housing and utilities, power, transport, defence). Commercialization and privatization have affected other, initially non-commercial spheres and institutions ofВ social life (education, science, medicine, culture). At the same time, the objective tendency ofВ the capital toВ expand and the expansion ofВ the effectiveness ofВ money-for-goods exchanges even at this time, during the peak ofВ corporate globalization and privatization ofВ welfare state, is not absolute and is always within certain non-economic limits. These limits may be material (limited space or resources), political (state borders), technological (transport and communications), related toВ social stability (social stratification is simply aВ downside ofВ capital concentration), security and long-term needs for modernization and the construction ofВ infrastructure, which require long-term investments.

Correspondingly, economic globalization, with its typical ultra-liberal economic model, should be seen not as an irreversible process, as neoliberal ideologues usually see it, but as aВ reversible and even cyclical shift ofВ equilibrium ofВ powers and interests between elites from various levels and other social groups.

The objective nature ofВ the labour theory ofВ value (LTV) does not signify the need toВ cancel limitations ofВ aВ non-economic type, as the limitations ofВ the LTV allow human social communities toВ exist. The constant tendency does not cancel out contrasting objective and subjective powers. The objective truth ofВ the law ofВ universal gravitation influences evolution, but does not cancel the living organisms on Earth that exist inВ constant contradiction with gravitation.

Liberalization and commercialization engender the degradation of extremely important – especially long-term – non-commercial spheres of social life (science, culture, education, marriage), that make up an essential part of human existence.

It is quite likely that crises in the global economy and internal affairs of certain states that are prompted by liberalization, commercialization and deregulation will in the future logically lead to the movement in reverse – namely to deliberalization and regionalization, as well as to the reinvigoration of such social institutes as nation states and ethnicities.

In any case, we see the example of Roosevelt’s New Deal that came to replace the decade of post-war liberalism of the twentieth century. Many other examples of successful deliberalization and deprivatization exist, above all the creation of the European model of the welfare state[145 - Erhard, L. Half a Century of Thoughts: Articles, Speeches / Translated from German by A. Andronov, V. Kotelkin, T. Rodionova, N. Selezev. – M.: Nauka, 1996. – 606 p.] and the construction of a whole range of viable models of socialism and compromise social models based on a number of civilizations and cultures.

The economy has seen global changes linked toВ the appearance and growth ofВ transnational corporations and globalized banking and financial structures.

Manufacturing has long since ceased toВ be merely national. It is becoming more and more transnational: only some ofВ the work on aВ certain product is done inВ any given country, while the item has toВ go through aВ long process from raw material toВ completeness through manufacturing cycles inВ many countries. Transnational corporations deal with this type ofВ manufacturing, but they do not focus on one activity or one product.

In the 1990s, the joint sales of 500 largest global transnational corporations were responsible for over a quarter of the world’s GDP, over one-third of global exports of the manufacturing industry, three-quarters of the trade in goods, and four-fifths of the trade in technologies. At the same time, about 40 per cent of global trade happened within transnational corporations.[146 - Lisichkin, V. A., Shelepin, L. A. Global Empire of Evil. M.: Krymsky Most-9D, Forum, 2001. – 448 p.]

However, it follows from these figures that only about 30В per cent ofВ the economy is globalized, considering national markets, including several exclusively local but very important economy sectors, such as housing, utilities and infrastructure. At the same time, only the high-technology sector ofВ the economy, which is related toВ basic sustenance, has been globalized alongside finance and its specifics.

1991 may be considered the watershed moment of the update of another component of globalization – the global crisis of resources and demographics, which was officially declared a global threat by the experts of the Club of Rome. The reports of this elite group of experts ordered by the UN[147 - Meadows, D., Meadows, D., Randers, J. The Limits to Growth. M.: Progress, 1994. – 304 p.] were created in correlation with representatives and structures of the global elite. Therefore, the reports of the Club of Rome and its members are not exactly independent research, but rather the position of global elites in relation to the problem of a global crisis of resources and demographics camouflaged as research and illustrated by certain scientific computations. The policy of the “nucleus’ states and international political and financial institutions (UN, IMF, World Bank, etc.) is based thereon.

The leading cause of the crisis of resources and demographics was the “baby boom’ in non-industrialized countries on the global periphery (South, “third world’ countries), coupled with the growing depletion and, by consequence, the growing prices of natural resources. These days, the baby boom in countries on the global economic periphery has led to a migration tsunami, irreversibly destroying the ethnocultural integrity of European nations and Russia.

On the cusp of the 1990s, the growth of the population of the “third world’ exhausted the results of the green revolution – the technological modernization of the agricultural sphere of the third world, initiated by industrialized countries and meant as a means of social rehabilitation of former colonies. The end to the growth of productivity against the backdrop of the growth of population and conversion of arable lands into space used for other purposes resulted in lower per capita grain production as an objective indicator of the lower food security and life standard in general.[148 - Borlaug, Norman E. The Green revolution // Ekologiya i zhizn’. 2000. №4 – p. 37—42.]

The stabilization of the fast pace of economic growth typical of the first stage of the industrialization led to the population growing faster than the GDP, which stamped out newly industrialized countries’ hopes for a new consumption level characteristic of the countries in the old industrialized and financial nucleus of the global system.[149 - Zhantiyev, D.R. Contemporary global economic system and Middle East politics of Russia on the cusp of XXI century. Part of cultural identity and globalization: reports and speeches – 5


International Philosophical Symposium “Dialogue of Civilizations: East-West” April 27—28, May 4—5, 2001. RUDN Publishing House – p. 27—31.]

As a result, the contradiction between the limited resources and the unlimited growth of population in countries with a traditional model of demographic growth left the confines of the third world and took on a new quality, becoming a global problem. At the same time, the crisis of resources and demographics is not only manifested as a growing lack of balance between the global population and world’s resources, paving the way for a global catastrophe, even based on an average model from the Club of Rome. The inconsistency of the demographic development, which put demographic and migration pressure on the countries at the nucleus, as well as on the countries of the industrialized periphery (for example, Russia) is no less dangerous.

How many billion men can our planet feed if the population of the Earth may reach eight billion by as early as 2020? This issue is becoming a matter of life and death for billions, rather than millions, of the inhabitants of the world’s periphery and half-periphery, who do not “fit in” with the competing projects of a post-crisis lifestyle.

At the end of the 1960s, Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defence in Kennedy’s administration, who later became, characteristically, the President of the World Bank, spoke about the threat of the “demographics explosion” and impending lack of resources. In fact, it was McNamara who brought the term “demographics explosion” into the political vernacular.

At the beginning of the 1970s, a secret directive on the policy on global population elaborated by a similarly famous figure, Henry Kissinger, was adopted by the United States National Security Council, wherein the policy on “containing’ the growth of the global population was equal in importance to the defence programmes in terms of US national security.

Similar reports on the inevitability of the deficit of resources and ecological crisis were received by other expert groups, which is not surprising: the problem of the finite nature of the global mineral and biological resources was up in the air: in particular, it was clearly formulated within Vernadsky’s theory of geospheres. The problem of the limits of growth was posed and solved in the USSR largely independently from the West and based on own scientific potential.

In particular, Nikolay Timofeev-Ressovsky suggested to academic Moiseyev[150 - Moiseyev, N. N. Long Time until Tomorrow. M.: MNEPU Publishing House, 1997. – 309 p.], a member of the Computation Centre of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the creation of a mathematical model allowing estimation of how many billion men may fit into natural ecological cycles of the Earth at the current level of technologies. Essentially, the wording of the task and its solution were comparable to the results obtained by experts of the Club of Rome.

Later, the problem of objective limits of the world’s population, based on some or other boundary conditions and limits, was posed more than once and the scientific community is focused on this now. In particular, the model of the Earth’s population growth made by the scientist Kapitsa[151 - Kapitsa, S. P. Model of the Earth’s population growth // Success of Physics. 1995. 26. №3 – p. 111—128.] and research by Kondratyev[152 - Kondratyev, K. Y., Donchenko, V. K. Ecodynamics and Geopolitics, V.I: Global Problems. St. Petersburg, 1999. – 1040 p.] received widespread attention.

First theoretical estimates ofВ the maximum Earth population date back toВ the times ofВ van Leeuwenhoek (1679), but most were published inВ the twentieth century, when humankind neared objective limits ofВ economic and demographic growth. The discrepancy between various estimates is from one billion toВ aВ thousand billion people, although the most realistic estimates ofВ contemporary researchers are between two billion and 20В billion people.

Most ofВ these estimates are based on mathematical models extrapolating the population growth curve based on regional dynamics ofВ population density, forecasts ofВ the accessibility ofВ water and land, estimates ofВ fertility ofВ arable lands, and other ecological and economic indices.

A well-known model from US demographist Cohen from Rockefeller University forecast a change in population based on the difference between the actual and the largest possible population density, multiplied by a certain constant known as a Malthusian coefficient. At the same time, the Earth’s human-carrying capacity is a function of a range of parameters of various quality, including subjective ones such as investment and economic climate defining the economic possibility of the introduction of necessary technologies.[153 - Cohen, J. E. How many people can the Earth support? // Sciences. 1995. 35. №6 – Р. 18—23.]

Therefore the population may invest resources in sustainable development or, on the contrary, exhaust the critically important resources that future generations need, which will influence the Earth’s human-carrying capacity in the future as well as in the present. It is typical that liberalization of the economy, orienting businesses towards receiving profit in the present (efficiency as profitability), is forcing capital to borrow from the future.

InВ this context, the global crisis ofВ resources and demographics is not made up byВ neo-Malthusians but is an objective component ofВ the global systemic crisis whose urgency is proved not only byВ scientific extrapolations, but byВ actual economic tendencies, reflecting the growing deficit ofВ natural resources as well as the growth ofВ over-population.

Moreover, it is the crisis of resources and demographics that is the primary reason for crises and catastrophes in the economy. The foremost importance of the physical nature of economy, putting material limits on market reality, was pointed out by such supporters of a physical approach to economy as LaRouche[154 - LaRouche, L. H. So, You Wish to Learn All about Economics? M.: Shiller Institute, 1992. – 206 p.] and Kuznetsov.[155 - Gvardeytsev, M. I., Kuznetsov, P. G., Rozenberg, В. Я. Mathematical Basis of Management. Steps for Society Development / Edited by M. I. Gvardeitsev. M.: Radio i svyaz’. 1996. – 176 p.] The inevitable growth of an objective component of global systemic crisis inexorably engenders its subjective manifestations such as altercations between the agents in the global process involved in the fight for limited resources, led not so much by the desire for profit and power but by the need for self-preservation.

The objective problem ofВ the physical deficit ofВ resources and population density leads toВ aВ subjective process ofВ remaking economic and social expenditures and risks ofВ global crisis, taking on the form ofВ growing competition and antagonism between globalization agents.

Not only is limited access toВ critically important resources threatening, but the process ofВ fighting for their redistribution is equallyВ so.

Evidently, with the need to spread out survival quotas when they are in obvious deficit (the Earth’s population at stable development is estimated to be between one and five or six billion people), the dialogue of civilizations at best turns into a cold war of civilizations and other agents of globalization widely using all available forms of confrontation.[156 - Safonov, A. L., Orlov, A. D. Globalization: crisis of global system as system of crises // Social-Humanitarian Knowledge. 2012. №2 – p. 114—125.]

One should note the appearance of qualitatively new forms of fighting for resources and living space, such as migrational expansion of the periphery, using the inner social vulnerabilities of the nucleus countries and the most liberal ideology, ignoring the issues of ethnicities and identity but incapable of “cancelling’ their objective existence.

As aВ result, globalization, as aВ completely new form ofВ interaction ofВ social agents, leads toВ the transformation ofВ contradictions into new social forms, largely different from those ofВ the age ofВ industrialization.




1.2. Attributes ofВ globalization


Economic determinism, dominant inВ globalistics, does not take into consideration the social being ofВ historical development, which has social groups and social structures rather than economic objects and individuals as its agents.

Meanwhile, socio-collective processes and changes, rather than macroeconomic indices, were and will be the stimulus, the result and the measure ofВ historical processes. At the same time, macroeconomic parameters are important indices ofВ social changes, albeit far from the only ones.

Well-known lists ofВ global problems and global threats are fixating on economy and population growth limitations due toВ aВ lack ofВ natural resources, but do not include global social problems.

Within the paradigm of the economy-based school of thought, which reduces globalization to economy and foreign policy, social mechanisms of globalization – including threats and challenges of a social nature – are not being studied or even recognized as they deserve to be, seen rather as the legacy of industrialism or as transient “growth illnesses’, a historical inevitability, the conscious change of which is useless.

As aВ result ofВ the underappreciation ofВ social forms ofВ development with their typical complexity and multifacetedness, existing lists ofВ global problems and global threats focus mainly on limitations on the growth ofВ economy and population based on aВ lack ofВ natural resources, excluding global social problems ofВ aВ non-economic nature, inВ particular the ethnocultural fragmentation ofВ large system-building communities.

ToВ look inВ more detail at globalization as aВ qualitatively new sociohistorical reality, several major characteristics, attributes ofВ globalization, should be singledВ out.

Some characteristics of globalization are widely known:[157 - Safonov, A. L. Attributes of globalization // Vestnik Buryatskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Issue 14a (Philosophy, Sociology, Political Science, Culturology). Ulan-Ude, 2012. – p. 32—39.]

• The major reduction of obstacles between local social communities, conversion of local societies into open social systems.

• The great scope of globalization, its systemic nature, encompassing all spheres of social life.

• The crisis of resources and demographics, as a result of humankind reaching the physically and ecologically determined limits of economic and demographic growth.

• The major acceleration of social processes, engendering the problem of lack of control and therefore instability of development.

• The establishment of global digital space as a qualitatively new social reality beyond space, whose significance is increasingly closer to the role of physical space and objective brick-and-mortar reality.

• The crisis of the nation state. The loss of importance of citizen nations and state institutions of the previous industrial era.

Some other special attributes ofВ globalization, which are not clearly formulated and substantiated byВ other authors, should be listed:

• The dominance of processes of divergence and differentiation linked to the disintegration, fragmentation and differentiation of local social communities. Forced adaptation of social communities and structures to a new, obstacle-free and transparent world, which is richer in competition and less stable, compels them to strengthen their functions serving to bar and protect.

• The invigoration of ethnic and religious communities and corresponding forms of self-identification and collective consciousness as the most significant manifestation of processes of social divergence, differentiation, fragmentation and competition.

• The multi-agent nature of globalization – namely, not only existence, but dominance of significant subjective factors reflecting extremely important interests of conflicting social agents, increasingly competing for global resources in all spheres and dimensions. Global unity of the world manifests itself in the global conflict of a growing number of social agents which are forced to become involved in the global social and economic environment. Escalation of the increasingly multi-agent and multi-faceted conflict is becoming the essence and content of the global unity of humankind: global conflict unites enemies in a single system much faster and tighter than global peace.

• The multi-crisis character of globalization as a system of crises and catastrophes influencing and strengthening one another, born out of the uncontrollable growth of global unity rather than resource-based growth limitations.

• The social backslide assuming a systemic, global character. The exhaustion of resources and reserves of economic, technological and social progress typical of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries objectively leads to social backslide. The latter manifests itself not only in several countries and regions being relegated to the periphery of global development, but rather in the desocialization of enormous masses of people, alienated and removed from material production, social development and social elevators.

LetВ us look at certain attributes ofВ globalization inВ more detail.

Undoubtedly, the most important and most obvious characteristic or attribute of globalization is the major decline of spatial, political and other obstacles that no so long ago separated local social communities – the appearance of global social space, which does not mean the convergence of the world’s population into a united culturally averaged community,

The complexity ofВ globalization as an object ofВ scientific research lies not only inВ its interdisciplinary nature, but also inВ its correspondingly systemic nature, the impossibility ofВ reducing the phenomenon toВ the sum ofВ its parts and ofВ separating scientific disciplines within the terms which are normally used toВ define globalization.

In this manner, the all-encompassing nature of globalization – its systemic character, including all spheres of social life – is another attribute.

The global crisis ofВ resources and demographics, as the result ofВ humankind reaching material and ecological limitations ofВ the growth ofВ economy and population, is aВ logical step towards global crisis.

Objective limits ofВ global natural resources and the establishment ofВ aВ vertical structure ofВ the world-system, which can be divided into the nucleus and periphery spatially and socially (revolt ofВ elites, erosion and desocialization ofВ middle class), lead toВ an increasingly non-equal development inВ all spheres ofВ life, on both the global and the local level. Increasing inequality, including social differentiation, is both the cause and the effect ofВ growing competition for all types ofВ resources.

The global economic system consists ofВ essentially non-equal interacting components, the nucleus and the periphery. The nucleus ofВ the global economic system (developed capitalist countries) is the zone that receives the bulk ofВ the profit during economic exchange, while the periphery is the zone that loses the bulk ofВ the profit. These components were shaped definitively inВ the twentieth century.

Twenty per cent of the world’s population – that is, the inhabitants of the nucleus or “golden billion” – saw their per capita income in real terms grow approximately 50 times during the last two centuries. At the same time, 80 per cent of the world’s population saw a growth three to five times at best, while in some cases it remained basically on a medieval level or became even lower than it was before the establishment of a global economic system.[158 - Borlaug, Norman E. The Green revolution // Ekologiya i zhizn’. 2000. №4 – p. 37—42.]

Apart from the nucleus and the periphery, a third zone is often marked out in a system, a so-called “half-periphery’, the most flexible element. Its existence is a constant of a kind, but any one state finding itself in it is a variable, conditioned on sharp and continuing competition.

Admittedly, competition for aВ place inВ the vertical structure is being led within the nucleus (the fight between developed countries for hegemony) as well as among the states on the periphery (the fight toВ enter the half-periphery with the hope ofВ entering, inВ time, the nucleus ofВ the global economic system). However, the latter have little hope inВ this fight as the nucleus has expanded its borders as much as it could as aВ result ofВ possible expansion ofВ the fight for monopoly.

Nevertheless, a new type of inclusion of the social periphery of the global system in the nucleus is accelerating – migrational expansion (colonization) of the global periphery into “golden billion” states, transforming the old contradiction between nucleus and periphery into qualitatively new forms.

The global economic system was built on the laws of monopoly, and the vicious fight taking place in the nucleus was a competitive fight not so much for equal access, but mostly for monopoly over global markets – i.e. for redistribution and reshaping of the spheres of exclusive influence.

Originally, in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, this manifested itself in the fight for control over sea routes and the most profitable littoral trade hubs in the countries of the East and the New World, through which an intense exchange of trade with Europe was being conducted. Then, starting from the first quarter of the nineteenth century, when Europe experienced an industrial revolution, a vicious fight began for the promotion of cheap European goods in Eastern markets. Finally, in the last third of the nineteenth century, the nucleus countries led the fight for a final remaking of the world order, as it concerned not only markets for manufactured goods but also objects of the export of capital – that is, investment targets.

The state, with its institutions, remains the most important tool inВ the fight for global dominance. The Western European nation state, since the beginning ofВ the modern era (i.e. the beginning ofВ the functioning ofВ the global economic system) and the expression ofВ interest inВ trade and business circles, has played aВ vital role inВ the process ofВ establishing the global periphery and the creation ofВ various levels ofВ payment for labour and consumption, corresponding toВ the three main zones.

The positioning of Asia’s Japan, which began ascending within the nucleus in the last third of the nineteenth century, is testament to the fact that the relationship between nucleus and periphery is wider than the West-East antithesis and the clash of civilizations.

At the same time, the liberation ofВ the countries ofВ Asia, Africa and Latin America from political colonial dependence did not bring any major changes toВ the global economic system.

Coercion byВ force was required toВ lower the status ofВ the defeated state and toВ include the victim ofВ the expansion into the global economic system as aВ source ofВ materials, aВ market and an investment target.

By the twenty-first century, when most countries on the periphery were steadily functioning, the need for the application of force drastically decreased along with spending on these endeavours, although the need for them was not completely exhausted, as many believe. Direct military pressure – albeit in new forms, lowering the extent of the permanent military presence in the countries of the periphery – has persisted and will persist in the foreseeable future, which may be seen in the examples of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and others.

The significant financial and social expenditures on governing the colonies with their primitive material production after the war – which did not recoup the cost of supporting colonial administration and security forces – led to the dissolution (according to several substantiated opinions, the dismantling from above) of the largest colonial empires of Europe and the transformation of former colonies into a neo-colonial exploitation regime. Characteristically, the United Kingdom offered partial independence to its colonies and protectorates after war, thus passing the government expenditures and moral responsibility for the low standard of life from the metropolis onto the administrations of new states.

Therefore, the transformation ofВ colonial dependency into neo-colonial turned out toВ be not liberation but aВ form ofВ raising the profitability ofВ the capital through the nationalization ofВ expenses (put onto governments ofВ new states inВ the periphery) coupled with the privatization ofВ profits from the most profitable companies remaining property ofВ the capital ofВ nucleus countries.

At the same time, decolonization ofВ the countries ofВ the global periphery, which took place aВ historically short period from the beginning ofВ World War II toВ the middle ofВ the 1960s, lowered political contradictions between countries ofВ the capitalist nucleus (leading toВ two world wars between nucleus empires), giving the capital equal access toВ the markets ofВ former colonies.

Paradoxically, it was decolonization – which lowered political contradictions between nucleus countries fighting for monopoly over resources and markets of colonies, included in the economy of metropolises – that allowed them to grow closer politically (NATO, EU, G7, etc.), focusing on the victory in the Cold War and, above that, accelerating economic globalization.

Evidently, obtaining nominal independence – i.e. a change in the international legal status of various territories – is essentially incapable of automatically changing its position in terms of the global economic hierarchy.

The established system ofВ economic elites, increasingly independent from national governments, is keeping aВ number ofВ countries and aВ group ofВ elites on the periphery as eternal debtors, which allows other groups toВ stay part ofВ the nucleus, raising their standard ofВ living at the expense ofВ the resources ofВ the periphery.

Characteristically, systemic opposition, including so-called “anti-system’ movements – i.e. mass social protests oriented towards overcoming “backwardness’ and increasing in some way the standard of living of certain population groups – is an important part of the process of permanent marginalization of the geopolitical periphery. This includes other workers’ movements in the nucleus countries, and communist and national liberation movements in third world countries (under various slogans, from national to religious to fundamentalist).

The joint result of their actions lies in the fact that, while introducing local tensions into the system short-term, they become, in turn, a stabilizing factor, creating legal grounds for building up the system of repression and total control over the population – which, in fact, is what is required for the global economic hierarchy to function efficiently and with fewer risks.

The uncertainty ofВ global development is toВ aВ great extent being strengthened byВ the fact that, apart from old power hubs, China, combining civilizational-cultural, economic, industrial and power centre functions, is confidently moving forward into first place inВ the global economic hierarchy.

Another attribute ofВ globalization, closely linked toВ the growth ofВ aВ propensity for conflict and differentiation, is aВ major acceleration ofВ social processes, engendering the problem ofВ loss ofВ control and, correspondingly, the instability ofВ development.

Steady acceleration ofВ social processes is increasingly frequently leaving behind their analysis and study, and, correspondingly, purposeful regulation. An additional factor contributing toВ the diminishing control is time constraints on control (over money flows, inВ particular), curbing the volume ofВ impact regulation.

Another widely accepted attribute ofВ globalization is the establishment ofВ global digital space as aВ qualitatively new, supra-spatial social reality, whose meaning is more and more comparable toВ the role ofВ the physical space and objective physical reality.

ByВ admitting means ofВ communication, the storage and spread ofВ information (digital media), digital paperwork and digital trade (digital money), and navigation, and integrating these into an unbreakable unity, the digital sphere has become the fourth spatial dimension, directly and immediately linking people who are inВ different places across the planet. This change toВ the topology ofВ the social space, having de facto become four-dimensional, has led, inВ particular, toВ aВ historically immediate global spread ofВ virtual social networks as aВ qualitatively new form ofВ social group, the relationships inВ which are effectuated through the digital space.

Another consequence ofВ the establishment ofВ the digital space, directly integrated with the social milieu, is aВ major acceleration ofВ social processes, whose speed is no longer limited byВ the speed ofВ physical movements and the spatial factor.

It took global digitization some twenty years to turn the globe into a “global village’, where everyone is potentially linked to any spot in the world and has access to previously impenetrable volumes of information. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this phenomenon is not being followed by adequate reflection on the significant negative social consequences of digital globalization and is being seen through the rose-coloured glasses advertising the IT industry.

So, the digital accelerationВ ofВ social communications and social processes, losing spatial limitations, is the reason for the appearance ofВ new types ofВ social instability and the loss ofВ equilibrium, as destructive, catastrophic social processes which do not require the investment ofВ time and resources are being accelerated first ofВ all.

On the other hand, the digital sphere and indirect man-machine social networks are engendering aВ qualitatively new level ofВ purposeful and centralized interference ofВ political agents inВ the life ofВ the society and individuals, which means the establishment ofВ new technologies ofВ alternative power and new power agents. Multi-agency, anonymity and the indirect character ofВ digital power, acting through the digital sphere, engender new types ofВ social threat.

An increasing number ofВ social transactions and relations are being carried out through the digital sphere, which is superseding, replacing and transforming the whole range ofВ social relations and institutions inВ the circumvention not only ofВ regular social practices, but ofВ legal procedures,В too.

As aВ result ofВ total computerization, aВ qualitatively man-machine social sphere has appeared inВ which each individual is taking up an increasingly dependent, unequal state, liable toВ be manipulated.

The example ofВ digital globalization shows that real globalization is not exhausted byВ processes ofВ integration and convergence following the establishment ofВ the global market and global economy. Globalization is going beyond the economy, byВ whose terms it was first defined, and taking on aВ more general character, leading toВ aВ wide range ofВ social processes, problems and threats ofВ various types related toВ key social structures inВ society.

AВ paradoxical situation has appeared, where public attention is focused on economic and technological globalization, but leading social tendencies ofВ globalization have still not been realized byВ the scientific community as objective development patterns. Correspondingly, attributes ofВ globalization that are an inalienable part ofВ it have not been fully discovered.

Another attribute of globalization is its essential multi-agency – that is, not only the existence, but also the dominance of subjective and ideological components, reflecting vital interests of conflicting agents of global development, competing for increasingly scarce global resources in all spheres and dimensions.

It follows from the multi-agency of contemporary global processes that there is no objectively pre-arranged, predetermined outcome of globalization, which supporters of globalization’s Western model insist on.

The Western view on globalization comes from an understanding of globalization as the stable perpetual dominance of an exclusively Western civilization to the end of time, which negates the very possibility of historical choice as such. Hence it appears that all non-Western and, consequently, peripheral, participants in global development may fit into and, as a result, passively adapt to the reality of the new global order, but cannot significantly change it, including locally. It has been suggested that a future global “suprasociety’ would be a unipolar semblance of a feudal, hierarchical system with the West at its centre and concentric circles of dependent geopolitical periphery of various levels around. In particular, such a model of sociohistorical development was proposed and studied by Zinovyev.[159 - Zinovyev, A. A. Toward Suprasociety. M., 2000. – p. 310—355.]

However, in recent years, the unipolarity of the modern world-system and the resulting pre-arrangement of history have been called into question by such influential experts Huntington and Haass. Richard Haass, Chairman of the US Council of Foreign Relations, sums up the “moment of unipolarity” that emerged at the beginning of the 1990s and offers a concept of “non-polarity”.[160 - Haass, Richard. The age of nonpolarity: What will follow US dominance? // Foreign Affairs. 2008. May – June. – P. 44—56.] At the same time, the significant difference between “non-polarity’ and “multipolarity’ suggested by many researchers and politicians lies in the fact that active agents, actors in the global process in the time of non-polarity, may be not only states and blocs, as is the case of multipolarity. Other social agents which do not have marked spatial and state-political features may become agents as well: transnational corporations, terrorist and criminal networks, and, above all, ethnic and religious groups, attaining agency.

Despite the canon of economic determinism, the disappearance of habitual spatial, political and economic barriers has not turned and will not turn humankind into a united social subject, a state society, evolving into a predetermined final state, the end of time.[161 - Safonov, A. L., Orlov, A. D. Globalization and problem of predetermination of global development // Vestnik Buryatskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Issue 14 (Philosophy, Sociology, Political Science, Culturology). Ulan-Ude, 2011. – p. 3—7.]

Therefore, globalization is not an evolutionary approach ofВ the unipolar world toВ an objectively predetermined stable equilibrium, but global antagonism ofВ aВ wide range ofВ social agents ofВ various types, with the outcome essentially unpredictable. The issue ofВ birth, life and death ofВ aВ wide range ofВ social agents determining the look ofВ the future is being decided inВ the course ofВ the altercation.

The practice ofВ globalization proves objectively that the unity ofВ aВ newly achieved global world means not the establishment ofВ aВ united social organism, aВ global state, but the appearance ofВ aВ global space, the lifting ofВ spatial and economic barriers between local social communities which used toВ protect them.

The multi-agency ofВ the global process means aВ qualitatively new character ofВ globalization: global unity inВ the global conflict among social agents. The world is united not as an inalienable whole, but rather as the field for permanent global conflict on which the fate ofВ all agents, actors inВ the global process, is being decided, be they states, peoples, social groups, or legal and physical entities. At the same time, the most important consequence ofВ globalization is the impossibility ofВ escaping global crisis due toВ its all-encompassing and universal character.

The escalation ofВ increasingly multi-faceted and multi-aspect conflict becomes the essence and the content ofВ the global unity ofВ humankind: aВ global war unites enemies into aВ united system faster and firmer than global peace.

At the same time, the state ofВ peace (as an absence ofВ war) may be defined as the state ofВ lower intensity interaction between agents, at least because peaceful coexistence does not pose the issue ofВ life and death ofВ the protagonists.

Correspondingly, the reverse is true: growing intensity inВ the interaction between agents up toВ aВ certain threshold (globalization being an intensification ofВ connections) turns into conflict. From this point ofВ view, universal interconnectedness is nothing but an objective reason for aВ global conflict.

Indeed, the erosion ofВ spatial and administrative borders has led not toВ the disappearance but toВ the aggravation ofВ disagreement among agents, including among civilizations and groups, and the transference ofВ old geopolitical conflicts into new non-spatial dimensions (informational, legal, ethnocultural) whose quantity and role continue toВ increase.

While earlier crises and altercations in self-sufficient local communities had a local, isolated character, globalization transformed local communities of all levels into open off-balance systems, having created powerful channels for a financial, migrational and informational “transfusion of crisis’, not only spontaneous, but also purposeful (“export of instability”), significantly lowering the stability of the global system in general.

As a result of globalization, a global systemic crisis has united a world-system not through a unity of interests and values, but through a unity of conflicts of the agents of global development, whose interests are objectively antagonistic.[162 - Safonov, A. L., Orlov, A. D. Globalization: crisis of global system as system of crises // Social-Humanitarian Knowledge. 2012. №2 – p. 114—125.]

Therefore, the study and analysis ofВ globalization inevitably loses scientific objectivity, inexorably suggesting an outlook on the global situation from the point ofВ view ofВ aВ certain social agent participating inВ globalization as the antagonistic conflict among various agents.

Attempts to create a descriptive theory of globalization are doomed to failure as they inevitably transition into the field of politics as the “art of the impossible’, into the strategy and tactics of political governing and political construction and permanent global political confrontation, with no foreseeable prerequisites for it stopping.

InВ general, globalization as aВ systemic social phenomenon has aВ non-economic character. InВ light ofВ this fact, it may only be adequately understood within the framework ofВ aВ sociophilosophical and sociohistorical discourse.

As for economic globalization, its role lies inВ forming aВ global social milieu as the field for the development and intense interaction ofВ phenomena ofВ aВ social nature.




1.3. Ethnocultural aspects ofВ globalization


The most important aspect ofВ the sociodynamics ofВ globalization processes is the correspondence ofВ divergent and convergent aspects ofВ social development. The dominant view ofВ globalization as aВ unidirectional and all-encompassing process ofВ unification and convergence follows from the economic determinism dominant inВ the scientific community. For example, it is accepted that social groups and communities, somewhat meaningful within the contemporary historical process, are almost exclusively formed byВ economic interests and relations. Nations and national (local) and global elites are usually considered such historically important groups. As for ethnos and ethnicity, actual ethnicity and ethnic identity are being accepted almost exclusively as belonging toВ isolated marginal ethnoses, adhering toВ aВ traditional lifestyle.

At the same time, the ethnic identity of members of political nations is either completely denied or admitted only as part of a sociohistorical phantom, a historical relic. It is significant that constructivism, as one of the leading movements of the theory of sociogenesis, denies the inseparable evolutionary character of cultural continuity, considering the contemporary flare-up of ethnic consciousness as a result of purposeful political propaganda in the interests of marginalized elites. Admitting, albeit under pressure, the consistent maintenance of ethnicism and ethnic identity beyond archaic communities, constructivism denies the existence of the modern ethnos as a real social community.[163 - Tishkov, V. А. Ethnos or ethnicity? // Ethnology and Politics. Scientific Journal. M.: Nauka, 2001. – 240 p.]

Globalization is considered to lead to crisis and the extinction of civil nations and nation states, which lose their economic essence by transforming relatively closed-off national economies into open social and economic systems. Based on that, one may come to seemingly logical conclusions about the inevitability and global character of convergent development engendering a certain global “suprasociety’ in which national, cultural and religious differences are being relegated to marginalized subcultures and will, in the foreseeable future, be completely eroded.

Correspondingly, within this approach, state nations, great powers and their blocs – and, since the second half of the twentieth century, transnational corporations – have been considered as actors in the global process. Globalization of national media markets and then educational systems, with global digital space as the technical basis, is the most important tool of ethnocultural convergence.

Therefore, from the point ofВ view ofВ economic determinism, the globalization ofВ markets and the flows ofВ goods, money, information and migration lead toВ the convergence and unification ofВ humankind, the erosion ofВ cultural and civilizational borders, and the formation ofВ aВ new global identity without any alternative as aВ product ofВ aВ global meltingВ pot.

However, processes ofВ real globalization, contrary toВ the logic ofВ economic determinism, suddenly moved toward ethnic, civilizational and confessional divergence.

InВ this context, we may see the increasing contradiction ofВ economic determinism as aВ dominant theoretical approach and the reality ofВ globalization.

In 1991, following the triumphant actualization of the Western scenario of the convergence of two global systems, the actual process of globalization – despite the destruction of economic and political borders forming local social communities – moved towards ethnic and confessional divergence. That is why none of the theories of ethno- or national genesis that appeared in the twentieth century can sufficiently explain the post-industrial increase in ethnic and religious feelings.

The long foretold crisis ofВ civil nations became not the synthesis ofВ global supranational and supra-ethnic unity, but the fragmentation ofВ post-industrial nations into ethnic and confessional groups.

Despite expectations, melting pots on the regional and global local level did not lead toВ the creation ofВ aВ homogenous society with aВ common identity.

An example of an unexpected crash of the melting pot theory in the course of globalization is the United States itself, where the term “melting pot’ appeared as an idea of a polyethnic, multicultural and multiconfessional immigrant nation. Strictly speaking, the US melting pot has not been functional since the migration wave of the end of the nineteenth century. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, the US society has been made up of a range of ethnic communities (Italian, Irish, Chinese, African-American) steadily maintaining their identity in an urban social environment.

Ethnocultural fragmentation ofВ US society not only persists but is increasing, despite the higher mobility ofВ the workforce than inВ Europe. Notably, at the end ofВ the 1960s, the United States was forced toВ abandon the melting pot model and turn toВ multiculturalism under the pressure ofВ several ethnocultural minorities, especially African-Americans.

According to Lozansky[164 - Lozansky, E. D. Ethnoses and Lobbyism in the USA. On Prospects of the Russian Lobby in America. M.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2004. – 272 p.], author of the monograph “Ethnoses and lobbyism in the United States’, ethnic minorities and diasporas in the United States are becoming more and more separated, creating within the bodies of power all the more powerful lobbies compared to the corporate lobby (of transnational corporations), and even a party system. At the same time, ethnic lobbies in the United States purposefully lobby the interests of the states from which they came: diasporas within themselves not only turn into diasporas for themselves, but are becoming the tools for ethnic metropolises to influence states admitting migrants.



Orientation of the United States toward the formation not of a single alloy in the �furnace’ of many nationalities, but toward forming of a motley multi-faceted multiculturalism led to logic results, a strengthening of positions of ethnic minorities.[165 - Lozansky, E. D. Ethnoses and Lobbyism in the USA. On Prospects of the Russian Lobby in America. M.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2004. – 272 p.]


ToВ prove his theory, Lozansky emphasizes that otherВ US authors are worried about the threat ofВ ethno-confessional fragmentation ofВ the American nation, up toВ the possibility ofВ Balkanization.

In particular, Huntington remarks on the increasing influence of civilizations in global politics and the stability of the links between immigrants and their countries of origin, believing that the basis for unity in the United States and the USSR is ideology, not a single national culture.[166 - Huntington, S. The erosion of American national interests // Foreign Affairs. – 1997. – Sept Oct – P. 35.] This points to the fact that the role of ethnic cultures and ethnic communities remains rather important. State ideology plays a vital part in the integration of society in this case.

The United States is aВ leading power hub inВ the contemporary world order and may be seen as an accurate enough model ofВ the global post-industrialized society. Hence it follows that the increasing role ofВ ethnicity seen everywhere inВ the world, the ethnicization ofВ politics and the conversion ofВ diasporas into agents ofВ local and global politics, is not aВ chance paradox but one ofВ the key attributive characteristics ofВ globalization.

Despite the expectations ofВ the end ofВ the twentieth century, the globalization ofВ the economy with its convergent focus engenders processes ofВ ethnocultural divergence. This partly reflects the ubiquitous strengthening ofВ competition for vitally important resources, objectively caused byВ the deepening ofВ the global crisis ofВ resources and demographics, but cannot be reduced toВ economic competition.

The erosion ofВ borders ofВ nation states and national economies has brought toВ life the process ofВ the reconstruction and regeneration ofВ ethnicities, including the process ofВ reinvigoration ofВ large state-forming ethnoses ofВ the Old World, buried byВ the theoreticians ofВ the twentieth century.

The ethnicization ofВ collective consciousness and the politics ofВ the states ofВ Eastern Europe and the former USSR may be seen from the viewpoint ofВ social constructivism, understanding the reinvigoration ofВ ethnicity as aВ purposeful reconstruction ofВ ethnos inВ the interests ofВ local elites, creating an ideological base for their nation state project.

The widely discussed ethnocultural crisis inВ Germany, provoked byВ the increasing lack ofВ loyalty ofВ diasporas toВ the host society, is an example ofВ the recuperation and regeneration ofВ state-forming ethnos from the bottom up, happening largely inВ contradiction toВ the interests ofВ German political elites, avoiding accusations ofВ German nationalism and ethnicism.

At the same time, the crisis ofВ the policy ofВ multiculturalism inВ Germany is aВ de facto affirmation ofВ the increasing ethnocultural fragmentation ofВ classic European nations, aВ manifestation ofВ aВ general tendency toward globalization.

Erosion ofВ the economic and political borders ofВ nation states, while not overcoming the contradictions ofВ the global crisis ofВ resources and demographics, transforms the conflict, transferring the contradictions from the interstate level toВ the level ofВ social groups including ethnic communities.

As a result, the link of ethnic and national self-identification to the economic model,[167 - Bromley, Y. V. On the issue of the essence of ethnos // Nature. 1970. №2 – p. 51—55.],[168 - Bromley, Y. V. On Theory of Ethnos. 3rd edition. M.: Knizhny dom Librokom, 2009. – 440 p.] quite fitting to the reality of the twentieth century, is becoming increasingly contradictory to the reality of globalization. As a result, nation and ethnos, seen as relics of bourgeois and even pre-state eras, are exerting more and more influence over the collective consciousness and global politics. The expected corporate globalization in reality turned out to be the globalization of ethnic diasporas and ethnoses.

Therefore, the reality shows that as globalization and the crisis ofВ nation states strengthen, ethnocultural differences are not smoothed over: the contemporary ethnos does not assimilate or integrate into aВ global multicultural environment, but steadily maintains its identity.

At aВ time when social institutions ofВ the nation state are living through aВ deep crisis, ethnos and ethnic and religious self-identification are experiencing aВ period ofВ revival and are inВ active demand among the masses.

The forced realization of the “ethnic renaissance’ of marginalized ethnoses and emigrant communities does not preclude the scientific community from ignoring the main problem of the current theory of ethno and national genesis, the problem of the existence of large state-forming ethnoses as the most large-scale social communities, making up the basis of the social community, largely independent from state institutions.

Driving forces and social mechanisms ofВ the ethnocultural fragmentation ofВ the contemporary society and their connection toВ globalization on the one hand and toВ the crisis ofВ the contemporary post-industrialized state on the other, have not been sufficiently studied either.

It would be logical toВ suppose that the objective driving force behind sociogenesis processes, transformation and the competition ofВ social communities during globalization is their ability toВ satisfy the most important needs and interests ofВ their members, ensuring that members ofВ the communities have additional opportunities and advantages inВ aВ more competitive and conflict-ridden global environment, devoid ofВ protective spatial and political barriers.

The cause of the divergent fragmentation of contemporary nations into ethnocultural parts was the narrowing of the state’s social functions, born out of the globalization of local economies The state of the industrialized era has in a relatively short period abandoned a whole range of social guarantees and functions, vitally important to citizens and making up the institutionalized basis of the social state in the middle and the end of the twentieth century. The post-industrialized state is increasingly losing the functions of largest employer, social guarantor and social regulator, including the role of regulator of ethnoconfessional relations and migration processes.

No less important is the state’s steady abandonment of its most important function as basic social elevator, carrying out principles of equality and ensuring vertical social mobility, uniting participants with the help of a united social future, the most important function for sociogenesis.

While classic European nations and national elites ofВ the industrialized era were formed byВ state systems ofВ universal education, the post-industrialized privatization, commercialization and globalization ofВ education means not only aВ lowering ofВ the previously attained educational level but also ofВ the social attractiveness ofВ the nation state and its institutions, rendering them less and less capable ofВ creating aВ social future for members participating inВ the nation as aВ social community.

The “revolt of the elites’ plays an important role in the ethnocultural fragmentation of contemporary civil nations, signifying the increasingly open abandonment by former national elites of key social responsibilities of earlier compatriots that created the basis of the welfare state and civil society in the second half of the twentieth century. Obviously, the abandonment by the state of system-building social functions leads to the devaluation of the nation as the most important social community for the population, ensuring the individual and group interests of its citizens.[169 - Safonov, A. L., Orlov, A. D. Globalization as divergence: crisis of the nation and “renaissance” of ethnos // Vestnik Buryatskogo Universiteta. Vyp. 6 (Filosofiya, Sotsiologiya, Politologiya, Kul’turologiya). Ulan-Ude, 2011. – p. 17—23.]

Elites’ abandonment of social cooperation and support within the nation forces an individual to search for alternatives to a nation – social communities – increasing competitive ability and security and allowing him or her to adapt to a new structure of society, changing his or her identity.[170 - Tishkov, V. А. Multiple identities. Between theory and politics (Dagestan) (co-authored by E.F. Kisriyev) // Ethnographic Review. 2007. №5 – p. 96—115.]

Sociological research has shown that the choice ofВ aВ new basic identity is predetermined byВ the individual possessing an alternative ethnic identity which takes the lead under the new conditions. As the system ofВ social relations ofВ aВ citizen with the state and its institutions are deconstructed, the citizen almost inevitably chooses an alternative ethnic identity, seeing him- or herself as aВ member ofВ an ethnos first ofВ all. Evidently, ethnic affiliation predetermines the choice ofВ religion inВ many cases.

As aВ result, globalization, while dismantling the social institutions forming nation and national identity, engenders the ethnocultural fragmentation ofВ polyethnic nations into ethnoses, which under certain circumstances become politicized, giving way toВ hidden and obvious ethno-confessional contradictions and conflicts.

Therefore, the understanding ofВ globalization as ethnocultural unification and convergence born out ofВ economic determinism is not proved byВ the social reality. The crisis ofВ the civil nation as aВ system-building social community inВ the industrialized era inВ the course ofВ globalization stimulates processes ofВ divergence and fragmentation ofВ nations, including the reinvigoration ofВ ethnicity, the consolidation ofВ global ethnic diasporas and religious confessions as agents ofВ global politics.

Transnational corporate elites, linked to global economic and global finances – and, as large and significant social groups on a global scale, possessing their own identity – have been formed in the course of globalization. Nevertheless, social roles and statuses proper to such groups, which would have significance for most individuals, have not been formed.

Therefore, instead of convergent development leading to a synthesis of a united humankind, one may see largely forced contact between local communities and groups, caused by the essential characteristics of globalization and leading to a battle for resources and increasingly non-spatial separation of competing social communities. Having created a united global field for competition for limited resources, globalization has strengthened processes of stratification, separation and group cooperation – that is, the processes of social divergence.[171 - Safonov, A. L., Orlov, A. D. Globalization as divergence: crisis of the nation and “renaissance” of ethnos // Vestnik Buryatskogo Universiteta. Vyp. 6 (Filosofiya, Sotsiologiya, Politologiya, Kul’turologiya). Ulan-Ude, 2011. – p. 17—23.]

Globalization, while bringing major change toВ the forms ofВ social interaction, not only transforms and destroys previous civilizational, cultural, ethnic, national, political, state and other forms ofВ civil life and corresponding civil communities, but also, out ofВ necessity, engenders aВ growing diversity ofВ social agents and manifestations ofВ their appearance and development. First ofВ all, those forms which, during the preceding historical development, have achieved aВ sufficiently independent local existence undergo aВ transformation.

Divergent processes – that is, the creation of new, more or less unstable social communities and other phenomena of a collective nature as a result of the transformation and fragmentation of previous agents and forms of social life – are inevitable in the course of this transformation. This flow of transformation, involving increasingly large flows of material, financial, human and other resources, inevitably leads to the appearance of a wide range of unstable social groups as typical dissipative structures, studied under synergetics, some of which will determine the shape of the future while others are doomed to disappear.

Moreover, at the present stage ofВ the development ofВ globalization, one may speak ofВ the sociogenesis vector turning towards divergence, which manifests itself clearly inВ the ethnocultural fragmentation ofВ local communities, principally inВ the crisis ofВ identity and ethnocultural fragmentation ofВ nations. InВ any case, the intensity ofВ divergent social processes will increase as global crisis processes strengthen.

At the same time, one ofВ the leading attributive characteristics ofВ globalization is the existence ofВ powerful tendencies ofВ aВ divergent nature, including ethnocultural differentiation and fragmentation ofВ local communities and ofВ humankind inВ general, the increasing multi-agency ofВ global processes, major sophistication and the diminishing stability ofВ the historical process.




1.4. The crisis ofВ the contemporary nation as the manifestation ofВ the essence ofВ globalization


Globalization is a global systemic crisis of a united world-system not only through the unity of economic and informational space, but also through the all-encompassing nature of the conflict of agents of global development, whose interests are objectively antagonistic.[172 - Safonov, A. L., Orlov, A. D. Globalization: crisis of global system as system of crises // Social-Humanitarian Knowledge. 2012. №2 – p. 114—125.]

Thus, another attribute of globalization is its crisis-like – or, more precisely, multi-crisis – character. The real globalization is not just a global crisis at the stage of acceleration, but a system of interconnected crises connected in space and time, impossible to reduce to the sum of its parts. That is why increasing complexity, instability, total competitiveness and propensity for conflict are characteristic of globalization.

Everything that was considered part ofВ the expenditures, contrasts or transition processes ofВ globalization is, inВ fact, its essential content.

The model ofВ globalization as aВ system ofВ sub-crises ofВ varying quality presents aВ more acceptable vision ofВ the complexity and dynamics ofВ globalization and its ability suddenly toВ engender major new social phenomena, including global challenges and threats.

Correspondingly, understanding globalization as an all-encompassing system ofВ interacting crises and catastrophes engendered not so much byВ growth limits for resources as byВ the unprecedented growth ofВ global interconnectedness, allowsВ us toВ move beyond the limits ofВ theoretical approaches formed inВ the last century that see the destruction ofВ the basis ofВ the industrialized civilization as growth expenditure. InВ fact, the very notion ofВ growth is losing its primary meaning ofВ exploration ofВ the outer environment resources under the conditions ofВ fundamental limits on natural resources.

Ultimately, the multi-crisis and multi-faceted structure ofВ globalization as aВ qualitatively new form ofВ systemic social crisis finishes the era ofВ stable socioeconomic progress and signifies the transition toВ aВ descending, regressive branch ofВ historical development, from the social progress ofВ the industrialized era toВ self-preservation under the total antagonism and instability characteristic ofВ the post-industrialized era. This signifies aВ gradual loss ofВ the crucial social achievements and possibilities ofВ the industrial era up toВ the loss ofВ agency and dissolution ofВ nations.

At the same time, the multi-agent and critical nature of social challenges and threats, which are attributes of globalization, has a positive side – a possibility to manoeuvre and govern, which is maintained not only on a global level but also on a local one, and is determined by the level of understanding of current social processes.

Therefore, looking at globalization as aВ systemic crisis connected toВ the exhaustion ofВ the progress ofВ the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and aВ transition ofВ the society and system-building social groups into aВ phase ofВ descent and crisis development allowsВ us toВ conclude that the most acute social problems ofВ current times are not the legacy ofВ the past, but an objective result ofВ globalization and its characteristics.

This means that the global social problems ofВ the present cannot be solved within the limits ofВ the existing paradigm ofВ global development, which is based on universalization ofВ the money economy, non-state and post-state, post-national forms and development priorities, antagonistic toВ the state forms ofВ the organization ofВ society.

Correspondingly, overcoming the negative social consequences ofВ globalization and its attributes is possible only through controlled curbing ofВ globalization processes.

On the whole, globalization is the development ofВ systemic social crisis as aВ multi-dimensional system ofВ interacting crises inВ various spheres ofВ social being, strengthening one another, which engenders aВ qualitatively new level ofВ complexity and acuteness ofВ contradictions typical ofВ social phenomena ofВ the newВ era.

The contemporary, essentially post-globalization stage ofВ the development ofВ the united world-system, which has largely exhausted the potential ofВ convergent processes and convergent development, is characterized byВ the dominance ofВ processes ofВ divergence and the diversification ofВ local communities. Forced adaptation ofВ social groups and structures toВ the new barrier-free and transparent but more competitive and unstable world forces them toВ strengthen their own barrier and protective functions.

Transnational and transcultural convergence and integration that were not so long ago considered leading sociocultural processes ofВ globalization are, inВ reality, increasingly limited byВ minimum consumer communication and common consumer standards sufficient for the existence ofВ the individual inВ aВ global market sphere and byВ the extended communicative standard required toВ work inВ transnational structures.

While, during the early stages, differentiation – cultural-civilizational, ethnic, political – had a largely spatial character, social differentiation of non-spatial character is dominant during globalization.

Thus, social processes ofВ divergent types, including the direct separation ofВ certain social groups and the increase ofВ barriers among groups, is aВ vital characteristic ofВ globalization.

The chief mechanism and chief cause ofВ differentiation and divergence is dissolution, the major weakening and loss ofВ social importance ofВ nation states and civil nations as system-building social groups and the degradation and fragmentation ofВ institutions and social groups ofВ aВ lower order.

Furthermore, differentiation and divergence are direct results ofВ crisis and conflict processes linked toВ the battle ofВ social agents for the redistribution ofВ increasingly scarce resources, during which not so much separate individuals as whole social groups are being deemed rejects and pushed aside from resources.

In particular, mass marginalization of the population of industrialized countries – first of all, of the middle class, making up the basis not only of production forces and the inner consumer market but of a nucleus of civil nations – is the result of the globalization of economy.

Desocialization ofВ the middle class is aВ paradoxical but obvious result ofВ continuing technological progress inВ the context ofВ the global economy and sharpening global limits on natural resources.

Catastrophic alienation ofВ the population ofВ industrialized countries from material production has obvious reasons: steady growth ofВ the productivity ofВ labour against the backdrop ofВ the deficit ofВ labour objects engenders aВ lack ofВ vacancies. However, these vacancies either move towards newly industrialized countries as aВ result ofВ the capital outflow or are lost byВ the indigenous population as aВ result ofВ mass immigration ofВ the workforce, destroying not only labour markets but also basic social structures ofВ host states, firstly civil nations.

As aВ result, globalization creates unsolvable social problems for social communities ofВ old industrialized countries, the very golden billion whose interests motivated globalization, objectively leading toВ the social regression.

The direct reason behind and aВ leading mechanism ofВ social regression was the crisis ofВ the nation state that reached its development peak inВ the twentieth century, and the corresponding system-building social group, aВ civil nation.

Civil nations, and social groups and structures ofВ aВ lower order included inВ them, ensured the full cycle ofВ reproduction ofВ the local social community as aВ closed system, potentially capable ofВ stable self-sufficient development.

The destruction and loss of importance of the civil nation as a structured social majority whose interests and activities ensured extended economic and social reproduction – i.e. progress – led to an increase in the importance of alternatives to nation and religious and ethnic social groups, as well as the separation of corporate social groups and elites.

The systemic social regression happening globally is not exclusively the consequence ofВ the crisis ofВ resources and demographics. The reasons for the growth ofВ stratification and mass desocialization at the beginning ofВ the twenty-first century have aВ social, group-like nature linked toВ major changes inВ the objective interests ofВ elites, separating themselves from local social communities.

For the first time in history (if one does not count the episode with fences in England) the elites are objectively and consciously interested in the quantitative reduction and qualitative lowering of material consumption of dependent social groups. This is manifested not only in actual social policy but on a conceptual level – for example, in the recommendations of the UN Population Fund.

While the elites were previously objectively interested in quantitative increase, material well-being and the civil loyalty of tax payers, at present, the growing separation of dependent social groups from the process of redistribution of society’s wealth is the source of resources for the elites.

The loss of importance of nations and institutions of civil society leads to an increase in the importance of social groups and identities, providing an alternative to the civil nation – ethnic and religious groups which not long ago were considered hold-overs, relics or phantoms of the pre-industrialized era.

The increase inВ importance ofВ ethnic and religious groups and corresponding forms ofВ group identity and collective consciousness has taken on such aВ scale and importance that it may be seen as aВ separate characteristic ofВ globalization.

Social regression, increasingly typical of our times, takes on a systemic, all-encompassing character and may be considered a crucial attribute of globalization and, correspondingly, a central global problem of the social order.[173 - Safonov, A. L. Globalization as regression: from the nation state to ethnos? // Innovations in economy; project management, education, legislation, sociology, medicine, ecology, philosophy, psychology, physics, technology and mathematics. Articles from International Long-Distance Science and Applicability Conference, April 29—30, 2013, St. Petersburg. St. Petersburg: Kult Inform Press, 2013. – p. 207—212.]

The exhaustion ofВ resources and reserves ofВ economic, technical and social progress, typical ofВ the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, objectively leads toВ social regression. It manifests itself not so much inВ the relegation ofВ certain countries and regions toВ the periphery ofВ global development as inВ the desocialization ofВ large masses ofВ people, the establishment and spread ofВ new social strata separated and removed from social development and social elevators. During the industrialized period, scientific and technological progress, increasing labour productivity, average per capita production ofВ material goods and involving natural resources inВ the economy led toВ social progress. At the time ofВ globalization, during which humankind is moving towards the fundamental limits ofВ economic growth, physically predetermined byВ the finite nature ofВ the planet, objective reasons appear for the social regression ofВ aВ range ofВ social strata, geographical regions and social institutions.

The very situation ofВ total control ofВ interests stipulating that the fight for the redistribution ofВ physically limited resources is aВ necessary prerequisite for self-preservation and development means that social regression inВ all its forms and manifestations, unthinkable inВ the twentieth century, becomes not only aВ characteristic, but aВ dominant trait ofВ the current global development.

This means that aВ global increase inВ the importance ofВ ethnic and religious communities against the backdrop ofВ the crisis ofВ civil nations is not only an indicator but also aВ vital social mechanism ofВ the institutionalization ofВ systemic social regression, society going back toВ archaic forms ofВ social relations and collective consciousness.

At the same time, even the utmost archaization ofВ social institutions, including zones ofВ long-standing ethnic conflict, is coupled with scientific and technological progress, organically and without contradictions, inВ the form ofВ the increasingly large use ofВ consumer variants ofВ advanced technologies: cellular networks, digital networks and media technologies, satellite networks and positioning, global transport networks, biological technologies (hybrid and genetically modified plants) and others.

This outwardly paradoxical coexistence ofВ social regression and scientific and technical progress characteristic ofВ globalization, however, creates cause for the deeper and irreversible fragmentation and archaization ofВ society on aВ local and global level.

The united world, on which many hopes were pinned (unable toВ come true, as is evident today), has inВ reality become aВ global crisis, with global catastrophe as aВ future possibility.

While inВ the 1990s globalization was thought ofВ as global equilibrium, aВ compromise signifying the beginning ofВ aВ new era ofВ sustainable development inВ the form ofВ aВ united humankind, it is obvious these days that globalization is the final stage ofВ the economic and social progress ofВ the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that has exhausted itself.

The global unity of the world did not engender a global noospheric synthesis, not a united humankind, but gave way to a global systemic crisis in all spheres of human existence, which is the essential basis of globalization.[174 - Safonov, A. L., Orlov, A. D. Globalization: crisis of global system as system of crises // Social-Humanitarian Knowledge. 2012. №2 – p. 114—125.]

InВ two decades ofВ the transitional period toВ the global world, aВ complicated system ofВ crises inВ separate spheres ofВ social existence took form, each not only potentially dangerous inВ itself, but also capable ofВ provoking aВ crisis inВ linked areas.

Therefore, the interaction ofВ separate crises gives way toВ aВ new, systemic quality, aВ possibility ofВ catastrophic generalization ofВ crisis phenomena.

While crisis in a separate sphere of life – for example, an energetic or demographic one – is usually a gradual and predictable accumulation of imbalance, an establishment of positive feedback describes a catastrophic character to the crisis, similar to self-accelerating physical processes such as chain nuclear and chemical reactions.

Basically, particular global crises include the financial-economic crisis, resources and demographics crises, political, ecological and other crises, each ofВ which may provoke global instability.

The crisis ofВ system-building social structures and institutions has been realized even less, with outward manifestations such as the growth ofВ social stratification, the crisis ofВ family and marriage relations, the lack ofВ social elevators and the growth ofВ social tension.

One ofВ the most important aspects ofВ the global social crisis is the crisis ofВ the nation state as aВ system-building element ofВ the global political and economic system. While inВ previous historical stages the crisis ofВ separate social systems had aВ local, isolated character, globalization is transforming local communities into open off-balance systems, linked byВ economic, information and migration channels as aВ spontaneous outflow ofВ instability and purposeful export ofВ instability, which has significantly reduced the stability ofВ separate states and ofВ the whole global system. At the same time, the crises inВ separate nation states have aВ ubiquitous, almost simultaneous character, having similar mechanisms and development scenarios.

The appearance ofВ aВ global supra-state social system may be considered aВ fait accompli; however, the character ofВ global unity as aВ qualitatively new phenomenon has not been studied and has not yet been fully realized. Despite the forecasts, the global system has not became aВ global state with its usual attributes. Despite declarations, this system does not regulate or freeze conflicts or contradictions, local or global. Global unity ofВ connections has not solved contradictions and has not led toВ the convergence ofВ parts into aВ harmonious noospheric whole. Moreover, we may see aВ noticeable lowering ofВ the stability ofВ development on the level ofВ elements and on the level ofВ the whole.

The unity ofВ the world born out ofВ globalization has become not only aВ sociocultural synthesis for all humankind but aВ global conflict whose reason is the increase inВ global interconnectedness. The world united as the field ofВ an all-encompassing global battle inВ which the fate ofВ all actors inВ the global fight is decided, ofВ peoples, states, social communities. At the same time, the important consequence ofВ globalization is the impossibility ofВ avoiding conflict because ofВ its all-encompassing character. From this point ofВ view, aВ global systemic crisis is similar toВ the arena ofВ the Roman circus, which was impossible toВ escape.

Characteristically, just like inВ the parable ofВ the blind men and the elephant, researchers focus on sub-crises inВ separate spheres and their particular aspects and, as aВ result, considerably underestimate the catastrophic nature, irreversibility and lack ofВ control ofВ globalization.

Many theoretical researchers reduce the global systemic crisis toВ its economic, political, resource, demographic or ecological components; sociologists study the crises ofВ separate social institutions without taking into consideration the connections between crisis processes.

The illusion ofВ predetermination, the pre-arrangement ofВ the historical development typical ofВ major religious systems and ofВ national and civilizational projects whose ideologies are detailed self-fulfilling prophecies, stands inВ the way ofВ the realization ofВ the threats ofВ the global crisis.

The certainty of political and religious leaders and the masses in the fact that all historical development trajectories inevitably lead society to a pre-determined, ideologized social ideal – the open society, the heavenly kingdom on Earth, the global caliphate, communism or noosphere – stands in the way of understanding the essential unpredictability, instability, catastrophic and regressive character of the ongoing global process, which does not, in principle, fit into the limits set by the theories and ideologies of the twentieth century.

Compared toВ the twentieth century, the attainability ofВ social ideals has become much lower under conditions ofВ global openness coupled with the lack ofВ resources.

Globalization turned out toВ be aВ transition from an era ofВ progress that has exhausted its development potential toВ aВ regressive descending era ofВ development whose characteristics include complexity, catastrophic nature, instability, liability for conflict and competitiveness.

The transition toВ regressive development does not mean simplification and primitivization ofВ the social reality, even inВ cases ofВ the death or disappearance ofВ significant social structures and agents.

The appearance ofВ new connections and degrees ofВ freedom under the conditions ofВ sharpening ofВ wide range ofВ divergent processes, during which new social agents and structures appear.

The all-encompassing social dissolution, with enormous resources previously collected byВ humankind, inevitably gives way toВ aВ new social complexity, aВ wide range ofВ dissipative structures engendered byВ the openness and off-balance nature ofВ social systems.

At the same time, processes ofВ social regression often imitate progressive development (reforms, modernization) or fit into system-building social institutions, state ones mostly. From this point ofВ view, the growth ofВ organized crime and corruption and their integration into power institutes is aВ typical indicator ofВ the transition ofВ humankind into aВ phase ofВ protracted regression.

The strengthening and collecting of contradictions, objectively coming from the lack of vitally important resources, gives objective cause to the new differentiation, fragmentation and polarization, to the appearance of qualitatively new non-spatial borders among conflicting social agents, creating cause for new social synthesis, the birth of new agents of the global development. So, processes of unification, typical of globalization, engender compensating counteraction on a local level, taking on various forms of ethnic and regional separatism, regional fundamentalism and other forms of social fragmentation and group antagonism.[175 - Safonov, A. L., Orlov, A. D. Ethnos and nation as agents of globalization // Socio-Humanitarian Knowledge. 2011. №4 – p. 218—232.]

But the dominant aspect of globalization is deep social change, predicated on the crisis of state institutions and religious and ethical bases of leading global civilizations defining history of the last two thousand years.[176 - Orlov, A. D., Safonov, A. L. Crisis of the nation state: globalization and legacy of the “axial age” // Russian scientific conference “Moral state as imperative of state evolution”. Russian Academy of Sciences Humanities Department. RAS Institute of State and Legislation. Institute of Scientific Knowledge on Humanities of the RAS, Centre of Problem Analysis and State Management Projects. M., 2011. – p. 25.]

The antagonism ofВ peripheral and dominant social communities and groups will engender essentially different, alternative values, models and forms ofВ social life. Having swallowed the whole world, the global empire engenders and nurtures within its borders new processes ofВ the formation ofВ structures.

ToВ sum up, globalization is aВ process ofВ the synthesis ofВ the systemic whole, but similarly aВ deeply fragmented and antagonistic global social community that cannot be reduced toВ the mechanical sum ofВ local communities and local economies.

The synthesis ofВ civilizations and states forced byВ globalization into aВ single, albeit heterogeneous and contradictory supra-system does not signify the expected transformation into aВ global state. Actors inВ the global development become participants inВ an increasingly multi-faceted and multidimensional conflict, wherein aВ global war unites conflicting parties into aВ single system much faster than the global world.

While the difference between peace and war may be defined as aВ major reduction inВ the intensity ofВ the interaction ofВ agents, as peaceful coexistence does not pose issues ofВ life and death for the sides, the opposite is also true: increasing intensity ofВ interaction (globalization being the intensification ofВ the interconnectedness ofВ the global system) inevitably grows into conflict.

Thus, the erosion of spatial barriers and borders has led not to the dismissal but to the aggravation of contradictions between agents, including intercivilizational and social ones, to the transition of old geopolitical conflicts into new non-spatial dimensions – legal, informational, cultural, demographical – whose importance is steadily increasing and will grow in the foreseeable future.

As a result, the situation in which spatial barriers are falling during the aggravation of contradictions and competition often leads not to the dissolution of social groups involved in the global process but to their additional consolidation and radicalization, the strengthening of non-spatial mechanisms of separation and the formation of identities, initially ideological and ethnocultural. In brief, it leads to sharp invigoration of sociogenetic and convergent processes.[177 - Safonov, A. L., Orlov, A. D. Globalization as divergence: crisis of the nation and “renaissance” of ethnos // Vestnik Buryatskogo Universiteta. Vyp. 6 (Filosofiya, Sotsiologiya, Politologiya, Kul’turologiya). Ulan-Ude, 2011. – p. 17—23.]

Persisting under the conditions ofВ globalization, local social systems can no longer be adequately described or adequately ruled outside the systemic context, be it aВ global cooperation or aВ global conflict.

Collapsing inВ on itself inВ the space, the contemporary ecumene takes on previously unseen complexity through new, non-spatial changes. Geopolitical agents continue toВ lose their spatial geographic localization and take on aВ qualitatively new topology which cannot be accurately described using the categories ofВ pre-globalization, when space was aВ universal regulator and aВ limit-setter for external impacts, aВ leading system-building and structuring factor ofВ ethno- and nation-building.

Due toВ aВ major increase inВ social mobility and transparency, national, corporate and ethnic elites are obtaining degrees ofВ freedom that are more significant than inВ the time ofВ the nation states, toВ the extent that it is possible for them toВ be completely separate from the national soil and state institutions. Non-state social institutions and structures, such as corporations, ethnic diasporas and social networks, which become full-fledged actors inВ global and local politics, are becoming the new elite generators.

While previously the world consisted ofВ relatively closed-off social systems, at present, local systems maintain and strengthen the regional and civilizational specific character, including confessional and ethnic particularities.

The social mechanism ofВ the influence ofВ globalization on the social sphere consists ofВ the establishment not so much ofВ global markets ofВ goods and finance but ofВ new mechanisms ofВ the reproduction ofВ the elites as influential social groups standing behind the actors ofВ global politics and forming it with their interests.

Characteristically, every large actor inВ contemporary global politics has aВ corresponding mechanism ofВ social mobility behind it, aВ generator ofВ skilled workers, or social elevators, alternative toВ traditional mechanisms ofВ vertical mobility, connected toВ the institutions ofВ the nation state.

It should be noted that the resource ofВ new, non-state actors derives from the policy ofВ utilization, well understood byВ the alternative non-state elites: the policy ofВ the interception ofВ the resource base ofВ states and nation states is often defined as privatization ofВ the welfare state. Not only are top managers ofВ large transnational corporations and international financial structures part ofВ new non-state elites, but so too is an influential, although relatively narrow, group ofВ the so-called international bureaucracy, managers at the IMF, the UN, the European Union and other influential international organizations.

AВ specific type ofВ new non-state elite is being formed within the borders ofВ global and regional ethnic communities, communes, diasporas and ethnocriminal groups, whose political influence inВ the world has grown significantly along with the growth ofВ global migration, the degradation ofВ the institutions ofВ the contemporary state, the erosion ofВ national identity and its partial replacement byВ the confessional and ethnic.

The omnipresent multiculturalization and ethnicization ofВ classic civil nations is developing inВ the United States, where multiple ethnic communities, increasingly oriented towards their countries ofВ origin, are becoming increasingly influential and transforming the traditional party system ofВ the United States into aВ system ofВ ethnic lobbies.

Non-state elites, comprising aВ social basis ofВ non-state actors ofВ global politics, are not separated byВ the insurmountable barriers ofВ old elites born out ofВ the nation state. On the contrary, they all intersect and fit together toВ create aВ single stratum, integrated byВ social connections and mechanisms ofВ social mobility.

Non-state local elites, interested inВ the resource flows ofВ nation states, rather efficiently reach their goals through the mechanism ofВ the intersection ofВ elites, gradually transforming the state, according toВ Adam Smith[178 - Smith, Adam. The Wealth ofВ Nations: AВ Translation into Modern English, Industrial Systems Research,В 2015], from political sovereign toВ night-watchman. At the same time, non-state social actors do not form global elites separated from historical soil, non-mythicized new nomads devoid ofВ cultural identity, but rather globalized strata ofВ national and local elites. These elites play out aВ liberal scenario ofВ the privatization ofВ national income, nationalization ofВ expenditures, mostly on national and local levels, but also on aВ global level.

Sketching out the social structure of a new global world, Richard Haass, the chairman of the Council of Foreign Relations, acknowledges the appearance in the social arena of new types of influential political and social actor, comparable in their abilities to the classic territorial state but having at the same time their own agency and interests independent from the state and its institutions.[179 - Haass, Richard. The age of nonpolarity: what will follow US dominance? // Foreign Affairs. 2008. May – June. – P. 44—56.] The transition of global politics into non-state and non-spatial dimensions, not linked to geopolitical poles and power hubs, is, according to Haass, “nonpolarity”. The situation of nonpolarity provides an organic base for the concept of soft power as political dominance based on the control and exploration of new spheres of non-force conflict in close cooperation with new types of influential social actor, many of which – for example, non-state organizations and private armies – are purposely created as foreign policy tools.

The growth inВ the number ofВ conflicting sides, typical ofВ contemporary times, the appearance ofВ new dimensions and trans-border connections, and the deepening ofВ contradictions are emphasized byВ the well-known concept ofВ controlled chaos, reflecting the essential characteristics ofВ globalization as aВ systemic crisis. This chaos is characterized byВ the existence ofВ many points where one has toВ make aВ choice (bifurcation) during the historical process, with potential governability ofВ such chaos through weak pressure on critical points and processes being another attribute.

InВ other words, governing the chaos is nothing but governing the flow ofВ crisis situations as special vulnerable points within the social process with consequent purposeful interference ofВ third parties inВ the resolution ofВ crises, which may be defined as aВ variant ofВ the multi-crisis approach toВ global governing.

What may be gained from the multi-crisis approach toВ globalization as aВ system ofВ interconnected sub-crises, transforming the world-system that was formed byВ the end ofВ the twentieth century?

Above all, the model ofВ the development ofВ globalization, as the mutual influence ofВ various sub-crises, gives an adequate idea ofВ the systemic difficulty ofВ globalization, its off-balance and catastrophic dynamics, its ability toВ give way toВ qualitatively new social phenomena and agents, first ofВ all challenges and threats. Such aВ view ofВ globalization as aВ system ofВ global crises and one catastrophe giving way toВ another, aВ system born not so much out ofВ the growth limits ofВ the resource base as the explosive growth ofВ global interconnectedness, allowsВ us toВ overcome the limited nature ofВ theoretical approaches formed inВ the last century, understanding the systemic regression ofВ the basics ofВ contemporary civilization as growth expenditures. The very concept ofВ growth, understood as the exploration ofВ the resources ofВ the outside environment, loses its meaning inВ the situation ofВ fundamental resource limits.

As aВ result, the multi-crisis model ofВ globalization acknowledges the end ofВ the era ofВ incremental socioeconomic progress, with humankind transitioning toВ aВ lower branch ofВ regressive development, from steady growth toВ self-preservation under the conditions ofВ total instability and antagonism. It means the loss ofВ the most important social opportunities and achievements ofВ the industrial era, at the very least.

An important indicator ofВ social regression is the archaization ofВ social relations and the mythologization ofВ collective consciousness, the increase inВ the importance ofВ ethnic and religious feelings, or the ethnicization and clericalization ofВ the politics. The fight for the redistribution ofВ resources and minimization ofВ losses is becoming the core ofВ the global process inВ the situation ofВ the global conflict ofВ civilizations.

The narrowness of the growth limits predicated on the scarcity of resources moves humankind into the territory of self-recycling, where outsider agents – including not only peripheral states, but, first of all, multiple influential strata in developed countries, including the middle class as their social basis – become the chief source of resources for the development.

The era ofВ systemic progress and growth is finishing: the time is coming for an inevitable descent as competition grows.

As aВ result, the limitation ofВ the resource base gives way toВ the degradation and primitivization ofВ system-building social institutions, the formation ofВ circles ofВ steadily depressive regions and settlements as the concentration ofВ resources inВ one sphere requires taking resources from other spheres ofВ existence.

From the point ofВ view ofВ ensuring steady development, it is important that one addresses the issues ofВ interference, mutual strengthening, synergy ofВ crisis processes, the appearance ofВ cause-and-effect ties between crisis processes, the export and outflow ofВ social catastrophes and the phenomenon ofВ their synchronization (the domino principle, trigger process, cascading catastrophes).

It is important toВ note that crisis processes inВ separate spheres, like systemic malfunctions inВ medicine, may provoke or strengthen, but not compensate for one another. Strengthening ofВ the crisis inВ separate spheres ofВ existence, or regions, may strengthen or provoke crisis processes inВ linked areas, resulting inВ the crisis becoming uncontrollable and then entering into the realm ofВ catastrophe. Thus, the phenomenon ofВ synchronization and generalization ofВ local crisis processes that may result inВ the transition ofВ local crises into aВ global systemic catastrophe is obvious.

The problem ofВ the synergy and interaction ofВ global sub-crises is characterized, too, byВ the instantaneous and global nature ofВ digital communications. The lifting ofВ spatial barriers objectively leads toВ the acceleration ofВ social processes whose development outstrips their study and, as aВ consequence, does not give way toВ the possibility ofВ purposeful governing and regulation.

The model ofВ globalization proposed inВ the current work, presenting it as aВ dynamically unstable system ofВ interacting global crises, creates aВ basis for understanding and forecasting social dynamics ofВ the global crisis, removing the methodological limitations ofВ economic determinism.

Moving past economic determinism demonstrates that globalization is not an objectively pre-arranged approach ofВ humankind towards the only possible equilibrium. It also represents aВ global crisis, the establishment ofВ aВ development which engenders major, often catastrophic and essentially unpredictable, social transformations connected toВ the establishment, development and death ofВ aВ wide range ofВ social agents inВ the course ofВ aВ global conflict that is no longer limited byВ spatial borders.

Having taken inВ all the available world, global social system continues toВ develop, maintaining an unreducible complexity and creating within itself new social structures and agents, thus creating the definite possibility and bifurcation ofВ the historical process.

Therefore, the main consequence ofВ maintaining the inner complexity, multipolarity and multi-agency ofВ the world-system is the indisputable ungovernability ofВ the sociohistorical process, reaching its maximum during historical crises.

At the same time, the systemic difficulty and variability ofВ globalization against the backdrop ofВ an increasing lack ofВ vitally important resources and increasing competition among the actors inВ global politics means aВ heightened risk ofВ catastrophe for humankind inВ general, as well as for aВ wide range ofВ social agents, with ethnic and national communities undoubtedly being the most important among them.




Chapter IВ conclusions


1.В The ontologistic nature ofВ globalization, as the leading modern phenomenon, is essentially impossible toВ reduce toВ economic phenomena given the establishment, development and major increase inВ the interconnectedness ofВ the global economic, political, informational and social environment. The unity and interconnectedness ofВ the contemporary world intensifies the interaction and antagonism ofВ all social agents, taking on the form ofВ aВ multi-dimensional, connected and therefore increasingly unstable system ofВ interacting crises powering one another. This engenders aВ qualitatively new level ofВ complexity and the dynamics ofВ the establishment and development ofВ modern social phenomena.

2. Globalization, as aВ qualitatively new form ofВ interaction ofВ social agents, leads toВ contradictions transitioning into new social forms, differing greatly from the forms typical ofВ the industrializedВ era.

3. Well-known theories and approaches toВ globalization do not fully explore the reasons, scale and consequences ofВ the ethnic fragmentation ofВ the social community typical ofВ contemporary times and ofВ the crisis ofВ the contemporary nation. This is related toВ the fact that the majority ofВ contemporary theories and concepts ofВ globalization are characterized byВ absolutization ofВ convergent aspects ofВ development, tendencies for global ethnocultural unification and the denial ofВ social regression as an objective tendency, an attribute ofВ globalization.

4. The existence ofВ powerful tendencies and processes ofВ aВ divergent nature is one ofВ the chief attributes ofВ globalization, being aВ process ofВ the establishment ofВ the global environment ofВ interaction and antagonism ofВ social agents. Growing social differentiation and the fragmentation ofВ local social communities and humankind inВ general is an inalienable part ofВ divergent processes, which are attributes ofВ globalization engendering major sophistication and aВ more fragile balance ofВ the historical process.

5. Ethnic and ethnoconfessional fragmentation of large and highly organized local communities – in particular, nations and humankind in general – is an inalienable part of divergent processes and systemic social regression, which are typical of globalization.

6. Intensifying interaction among social agents, globalization objectively engenders increasing antagonism ofВ all social agents and communities, including ethnoses and nations, which inevitably takes on aВ multi-dimensional, connected and therefore increasingly unstable system ofВ interacting crises strengthening one another.

7. One attribute ofВ globalization is the global increase inВ the number ofВ phenomena ofВ social regression, aВ symptom and mechanism ofВ which is ethnic fragmentation ofВ the social community and, correspondingly, primitivization and archaization ofВ system-building, social communities and institutions ofВ the industrialized era, and increasing importance ofВ the role ofВ ethnoses and social institutions typical ofВ them.




Chapter II. Notions ofВ ethnos and nation as basic categories ofВ sociophilosophical discourse





2.1. Genesis and evolution of notions “nation” and “ethnos” as categories of philosophical discourse and historical perspective


To analyse patterns of the appearance, establishment and development of such social communities as ethnos and nation that manifested themselves under the influence of globalization processes, one should look into the genesis and evolution of such concepts as “nation’ and “ethnos’ as categories of sociophilosophical discourse, which will allow us to differentiate given theoretical categories and the social phenomena behind them.

The semantics of the concepts in question are comparable in the context of various languages and cultures, where they may have not only different shades of meaning, but often very different meaning in general. It is important to differentiate the almost identical notions of, for example, “nation’ in English and “нация” (natsiya) in Russian.

The meaning of the word “nation’ and related notions differs in various European languages, in particular in French and in German, where the difference in meaning stems from the history of the formation of German and French political nations. While France was formed as a synthesis of historical provinces heterogeneous in terms of language and culture, Germany as a political agent was formed as a result of a political unification of German dukedoms, the population of which was disconnected politically but understood clearly the close links based on culture and history as well as on the German standard language that had by then been formed.

The English term “nation’ has its own cultural and historical particularities, which prove a pattern-like dependence of sociopolitical terminology on the concrete historical conditions under which it was formed.

So, “national’, often translated into Russian directly as “национальный” (natsionalny: национальный Mузей – national museum; национальная безопасность – national security; национальная сборная – national team; национальная история – national history), in fact corresponds better to the Russian terms “state’ and “peoples’, whereas национальный in Russian is widely used when speaking of ethnic minorities and ethnic territorial autonomies included in a federation.

Illustrative cases have been known where a notion borrowed from the English political vernacular via a direct translation, such as natsional’naya bezopasnost’ (national security), is then understood in the scientific and expert community of national-territorial regions of Russia as the security of the state-forming nation (in fact, the state-forming ethnos) of a certain region, but not as a security of the state in general, as it was in English language.

At the same time, the existence of cultural and linguistic particularities in the interpretation of the term “nation’ only highlights the fact that the term has a stable range of meanings, shared by various cultures, on which, according to the author, the objective existence of nations as social communities is based.

In a historical retrospective, the concept of “nation’ that has entered all European languages cam stemmed from the Latin nasci which meant “birth’ and was contrasted by Roman citizens with “barbaric’ communities based on family and tribal relations and common law.

Thus, the term “nation’ appeared and was used in Ancient Rome attached to a meaning rather close to the contemporary one, especially during the emperors’ Rome with its developed civil society and watered-down Roman ethnos.

After the Western Roman Empire fell, feudal states that appeared on its former territories took on, along with the Latin language as a universal European lingua franca, the dichotomous use of two words, natio and gens (the latter directly translated as “tribe’) to designate civilized (Christian) nations as opposed to barbarians (pagans).

It is especially important that the original natio-gens dichotomy, highlighting the difference between the developed civil society ofВ the empire ofВ Rome and the primitive social institutions ofВ the barbaric periphery ofВ Rome, finding itself at the stage ofВ dissociation ofВ the tribal lifestyle, echoes the modern nation-ethnos dichotomy.

This becomes all the more important inВ light ofВ the fact that the Greek word ethnos, introduced into the wide scientific vernacular not so long ago, has, inВ reality, almost the same meaning as the Latin gens, denoting cultural and genetic commonality with undeveloped political institutions (at the pre-state development stage) or taken without consideration ofВ the political component.

It is also important to consider the medieval period in order to differentiate clearly between the concepts of “ethnos’ and “nation’. Characteristically, tribes (to be more precise, tribal nobility, elites) of the former barbaric periphery of Rome that were part of the empire of the Carolingian dynasty which gave names to historical provinces and feudal dukedoms (the Burgundians, the Lotharingians, the Bretons, the Franks, the Bavarians, the Saxons and others), insisted on calling themselves “nations’ for a long time after the Western Roman Empire collapsed.

Obviously, in calling their lands “nations’, feudals did not emphasize the ethnocultural particularities of their subjects. They were raising their political status within the Holy Roman Empire from provincial or even tribal to imperial. Thus, medieval political elites legitimized their political ambitions to subjugate and swallow neighbouring political entities.

Thus, inВ the early medieval period, the concept ofВ aВ nation (natio) as aВ social unity was inseparable from the state and political component, basic institutions ofВ which were directly inherited from Rome, but was at the same time linked toВ local political entities and historical provinces typical ofВ the Middle Ages.

At the same time, the use of the natio concept was linked to feudal entities’ claims for territorial and political expansion, at the very least a new level of political sovereignty, which is exemplified by the history and titling of the hold-over of the empire of Rome, the Holy Roman Empire, later the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (Sacrum Imperium Romanum Nationis Germanicae, Sacrum Imperium Romanum Nationis Teutonicae) or, in German, Heiliges Römisches Reich Deutscher Nation. This complicated political aggregation of feudal states that existed in 962—1806 and in its most prosperous period included Germany, Northern and Central Italy, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and some of the French regions.

During the late medieval period, nations assumed new social meaning. Although chronicles and documents call certain peoples and the population of historical provinces “nations’, starting from the fifteenth century the term begins to assume yet another meaning, closer to its contemporary use: the concept of the “German nation’ appears, albeit without lower classes included in it.

At the same time, the concept of “nation’ keeps obtaining new meanings. In universities, fraternity-like student corporations were called nations.[180 - Nikolsky, V. S. University autonomy and academic freedom // Higher Education in Russia, 2008. #6 – Р. 147—155.] Ex-territorial social and political institutions typical of the Middle Ages, such as cathedrals, religious orders combining knighthood and spirituality (Maltese, in particular), guilds and other corporate organizations were also based on nations. Therefore, nations were territorial entities of corresponding social institutions, linked to certain kingdoms, dukedoms and large historical provinces.

Thus, the use of the concept of “nation’ in the Middle Ages shows that this term’s semantics, albeit different from today, were closely related to the developed and rationally organized political and social institutions inherited from the empire of Rome. These institutions were contrasted with more primitive social structures characteristic of the geopolitical periphery of the Christian world of the time.

Initially used to distinguish the civilized population of the geopolitical nucleus of the empire from tribes on the barbaric periphery with their different cultures, the concept of “nation’ was used during the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance to designate rationally organized social groups often corresponding to territorial division into political entities and historical provinces.

According toВ Ziegler, during the Middle Ages,



Natio is a union with a purpose, a local administratively subgroup, as a faction, a governmental unit, etc. This word does not have the full meaning as a representative political subdivision. It does not mean a predetermined form of the community, does not contain any indication toward the chief line of the social connection or division.[181 - Ziegler, H. O. Die moderne Nation. Ein Beitragzur politischen Soziologie. Tubingen, 1931. – Р. 23.]


According toВ Yury Granin,



…evolution of the meaning of the concept “nation’ in the Middle Ages corresponded to the evolution of the European society of the time, with its typical corporate (guild and estate) social structure and feudal fragmentation, which preserved local communities as they were and prevented large economic and cultural spaces from being created. That is why the next stage of the evolution of understanding of what “nation’ means was historically linked to the transition of the economic sphere to the capitalist (industrialized) method of producing material goods. In terms of politics, this phenomenon was linked to the process of the formation of centralized bourgeois-democratic states in Europe, which in the course of time united their territories’ multiple linguistic and ethnic groups into relatively homogenous communities, culturally and politically.[182 - Granin, Y. D. Ethnoses, Nation State and Formation of the Russian Nation. Experience of Philosophical and Methodological Research. – M.: IF RAN, 2007. – p. 11—12.]


In terms of collective consciousness, the objective process of the dissolution of feudalism and the inclusion of village communities and social lower classes into the economic, political and cultural life of the state manifested itself in a steady contrast between the concepts of “nation’ and “people’.

Initially, only nobility and aristocracy by birth, as well as clergy, claimed the right to be part of the “nation’, thus limiting “nation’ to social elites. The third estate’s claims to being part of the nation signified a watershed moment followed by the crisis and fall of the feudalism.

So, in the eighteenth century, the third estate, gaining strength, did not want its members – traders, financiers, lawyers and freelancers – to be part of “people’, believing it deserved to be part of the “nation’ alongside nobility and clergy. In connection with this, Kozing notes that as early as Abbé Sieyès’ What is the Third Estate? the bourgeoisie was unequivocally considered a “nation’ – that is, “included in elites and separated from the peasantry which remained a tax-paying estate that did not participate in the political life”.[183 - Kozing, A. Nation in History and Contemporary Times (Research in Connection to Historical-Materialistic Theory of the Nation). M.: Mysl’, 1978. – p. 39.]

At the same time, one cannot help but notice that the evolution ofВ the concept ofВ the nation, from Rome with its developed civil institutions toВ the Middle Ages and then toВ our times, serves as an adequate reflection ofВ the evolution ofВ nation as aВ social group whose main feature is direct (albeit passive) involvement inВ the functioning ofВ the social and political institutions ofВ the state and the civil society.

InВ Rome, with its developed civil society, the whole population ofВ the empire was inВ one way or another involved inВ the activities ofВ the state institutions, and the concept ofВ the nation included all citizens ofВ Rome. At the same time, the barbaric periphery ofВ the empire, which was at the stage ofВ tribal unions and the dominance ofВ tribal relations, was objectively closer toВ tribes (gens).

During the medieval period, the concept of the nation and the social class that considered itself part of it understandably narrowed down to the elite of the stratum, linked to the political and church power and state governing. Thus, medieval nations were relics of the late Roman Empire’s civil society, surrounded by the seas of natural economy and tribal archaisms. Nevertheless, the concept of the nation remained as the name for a system-building social group, defining the system of power (political) relations.

The consequent growth ofВ cities, professions and trade was followed byВ the justifiable expansion ofВ the meaning ofВ the term, but this expansion was an objective reflection ofВ the increase ofВ the population and ofВ the influence ofВ the social group, comprising the civil society ofВ the time with its stratified limitations.

The beginning of the Industrial Revolution and the increase in importance of the third estate was followed by demands to recognize it as a “nation’ – that is, to grant it civil rights corresponding to its role in the life of the society. Correspondingly, bourgeois revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries removed obstacles to the expansion of the nation as a concept and as a social group, up to the size of the whole population of the state.

The final fixation of the concept of nation as a structured, culturally and psychologically integrated community of the subjects of the same state is linked to outstanding German philosopher Georg Hegel, who provided the most complete and system-like description of the sociophilosophical problem of the formation and evolution of nations among his contemporaries. In fact, Hegel introduced the very notion of the “nation’ as a basic category in sociophilosophical discourse.

The sociophilosophical doctrine of Hegel is based on the premise that historical development of humankind is predetermined by the evolution of a “global spirit’, which expresses itself through social manifestations of the “spirit of the nation’ (the “spirit of the people’).

According to Hegel, every nation is characterized by the development of the “spirit of the people’, which manifests itself in social forms and “is a certain spirit that creates an obvious, factual world, that… exists in its religion, in its cult, its customs, in its state system and its political laws, in all its institutions, in its actions and activities”.[184 - Hegel, G. Works, V. VIII. 1935. – p. 71.]

At the same time, Hegel’s “spirit of the people’ is a form in which the “global spirit’ can manifest itself: “Principles of spirits of a people in the necessary continuity are themselves only moments of a single united spirit, which elevates and finishes in the history through them, understanding itself and becoming all-encompassing”.[185 - Hegel, G. Works, V. VIII. 1935. – p. 71, 75.]

Hegel’s “global spirit’ is reflected in history: “In global history, the idea of the spirit manifests itself in reality as a range of external forms, each of which finds its manifestation in an actively existing people. But this side of the existence is given in time as well as in space in the form of the natural existence and a special principle, typical of every global and historical people is also typical of it as a natural definitiveness.”




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notes


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